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Medication-Assisted Treatments (MAT) are pharmaceutical products used to treat patients' 
opioid use disorder and have become essential therapies in combatting the devastating effects of 
the United States Opioid Epidemic.  However, several issues plague the MAT market, such as 
those related to manufacturer competition, patient adherence, and racial and ethnic treatment 
disparities.  This dissertation studied each of these issues in individual chapters.  The first 
chapter evaluated a defining antitrust event in the MAT market.  Specifically, Reckitt Bensickler 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when they launched Suboxone Film and made false claims 
regarding the safety of Suboxone Tablet in order to switch patients to the film. This action, 
known as a product hop, allowed Reckitt to maintain high market share and prices in the MAT 
market for years after the expiration of their patent on Suboxone Tablet. .  I determined the 
clinical consequences of this event by comparing observed health outcomes with predicted 
outcomes in a counterfactual scenario where the product hop never occurred.  But for the product 
hop, I found that there would have been roughly 10% fewer adverse opioid events between 2010-
2017 due to changes in treatment use.  In response, I suggested additional scrutiny of the FDA 
regarding the added clinical benefit of line extensions to prevent product hops from successfully 
derailing generic entry.  The second chapter studied the financial and clinical consequences of 
patient nonadherence to MATs.  In particular, I estimated the effect of buprenorphine treatment 
gaps on adverse opioid events and monthly patient total spending, medical spending, and 
prescription drug spending.  During months in which patients had more than half the days 
without MAT treatment (i.e., a “gap month”), I showed that the risk of adverse opioid events was 
2.83-7.79 times higher, which translated to a $63.7-$684.6 increase in total spending in that 
month.  I further demonstrated a large increase in medical spending in months with treatment 
gaps that exceeded decreases in prescription drug spending. I also found evidence of 
heterogeneity in effect of buprenorphine treatment gaps by dosage.  Patients experienced fewer 
costly adverse opioid events during treatment gaps with higher dosages, likely due to protective 
effects of residual buprenorphine.  I conclude by suggesting policymakers and practitioners 
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increase the rate at which patients are maintained and initiated on higher dosages of 
buprenorphine.  The final chapter of the dissertation focused on quantifying racial and ethnic 
MAT treatment disparities and specifically tried to measure the effect of social versus provider 
factors in driving these disparities.  To do so, I compared base model estimates that used only 
indicators for race and ethnicity with additional specifications that added social vulnerability 
indexes, patient-provider proximity, and provider-level fixed effects.  The analyses showed 
evidence of significant racial and ethnic disparities in MAT access and use in Medicare.  They 
also illustrated that provider factors, such as provider bias and practice patterns, are essential 
modifier of MAT use in particular.  As a policy recommendation, I promoted incentivizing and 
educating providers to expand treatment to underserved groups as well as greater investment into 




Health Consequences of Strategic Delay in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Effect of the 




A product hop is a controversial practice in which a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer 
acts to transition patients to a newer and slightly modified version of one of their existing 
products just before generic entry.  By eradicating the original product's demand, generic 
entrants struggle to penetrate the market, and the brand manufacturer typically maintains high 
market share and prices on the new product. A product hop harms patients financially by 
restricting the use of less expensive generic alternatives, but little is known about how it might 
also affect patient health.  This study determined the clinical effect of the Suboxone product hop, 
which disrupted the market for Medication-Assisted Treatments (MAT) for opioid use disorder 
during a critical growth period of the U.S. Opioid Epidemic.  In particular, this study estimated 
the effect of the Suboxone product hop on adverse opioid events (e.g., opioid abuse, overdose, 
and adverse effects) among Medicare beneficiaries between 2010-2017.  The study used a 
discrete-time survival model with competing risks conditioned on predicted demand in the 
counterfactual absence of the product hop.  Without the product hop, the analyses showed a 
9.6%–10.6% reduction in the number of patients experiencing one or more adverse opioid events 
between 2010-2017 due to increased treatment use in the counterfactual.   Regulators should 





Deaths from opioid overdoses currently exceed car accidents in the U.S. as the number 
one cause of accidental death (National Safety Council, 2018). The primary treatments used to 
prevent deaths from opioid overdose are Medication-Assisted Treatments (MATs).  MATs are 
drugs that remediate cravings and mitigate symptoms of withdrawal following the long-term use 
of opiates.  However, pharmaceutical manufacturer Reckitt Bensickler fundamentally changed 
the MAT market in the early 2010s by product hopping.   
To maintain its dominance in the MAT market, Reckitt launched a film reformulation of 
their blockbuster MAT, Suboxone tablet, and then acted to shift patients and providers from the 
tablet to the film in the period just before generic entry (Carrier, 2017).  By transitioning over 
70% of tablet users to the film before generics could enter the market, Reckitt maintained a high 
market share and price for Suboxone film for years after generic Suboxone tablets had launched 
(Suboxone Complaint, 2015).  Despite the product hop's significance in shaping MAT pricing 
and use, its effect on patient health is unknown. 
A product hop can affect patient health by changing prices and use patterns.  The primary 
concern antitrust regulators have with a product hop is that they can sustain high treatment prices 
by limiting generic entry and market penetration.  The resulting lack of affordable treatment 
threatens population health by reducing treatment initiation and adherence (Gibson et al., 2005).  
However, if the innovation provides clinical benefit for at least some proportion of the 
population above and beyond existing treatments, its entry may be justifiable.   
This study estimated the effect of the Suboxone product hop on adverse opioid events 
(i.e., opioid overdose, abuse, and adverse effects) using a discrete choice model linked to a 
discrete-time survival model under a counterfactual analysis.  First, a discrete choice model 
estimated under mixed-effects logistic regression was used to determine empirical MAT demand.  
I then modified covariates and patient choice sets to reflect firm behavior in a hypothetical world 
where the product hop never occurred to obtain the counterfactual product choice probabilities.  
From there, the study used a survival model to relate time-varying treatment decisions to adverse 
opioid events.  I then generated the approximate frequency of adverse opioid events without the 
product hop from this model after replacing the observed choices with counterfactual choice 
probabilities.  In the absence of the product hop, I find a 9.6%–10.6% decrease in total adverse 
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opioid events between 2010-2017 relative to the observed.  The analyses show that this reduction 
is primarily a consequence of increased MAT use in the counterfactual. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Details surrounding the role of MATs in counteracting the opioid crisis, firm incentives 
for strategic delay behaviors like product hopping in the pharmaceutical entry, and the Suboxone 
antitrust litigation inform the conceptual framework and empirical model presented in the paper.  
Therefore, the background section is separated into three different sections. Section 1 reviews 
essential considerations in the MAT product market, such as differences between MAT products 
and MAT use in Medicare, the study setting. Next, section 2 explains firms’ motivations behind 
product hopping and its implications for patients.  Finally, section 3 describes the primary 
sequence of events that represented the Suboxone product hop. 
Section 1: The U.S. Opioid Crisis and Medication Assisted Therapies 
Between 1999–2018, the U.S. opioid epidemic killed nearly 450,000 Americans or 
approximately 62 per day (Center for Disease Control, 2018).  Opioid overdoses are by far the 
most common kind of drug overdose in the U.S.  In 2018, opioid overdoses represented about 
70% of all fatal overdoses (Department of Health & Human Services, 2018).  This fact is 
particularly concerning as growth in abuse has been staggering over the last decade.  For 
example, between July 2016 and September 2017, total emergency department visits for opioid 
overdoses increased by 30% (Centers for Disease Control, 2018).  In 2018, 10.3 million people 
aged 12 or older misused opioids (Lipari and Park-Lee, 2018). 
Opioid manufacturers and physicians have been the primary defendants in litigation 
brought by state and federal prosecutors in response to the opioid epidemic.  These prosecutors 
have recovered billions of dollars through class action settlements with these parties following 
allegations that they put financial gain before their patients' lives.  However, culpability may 
extend beyond opioid prescribers.  In particular, by product hopping, Reckitt likely hindered 
access to one of the most vital opioid use disorder treatments during the height of the epidemic.  
Although Reckitt has faced legal consequences for the Suboxone product hop for antitrust and 
fraud violations, their role in limiting the use of generic MATs as the epidemic worsened has not 
yet been explored as a contributing factor to the consequences of the crisis.   
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MATs are critical therapies that treat opioid use disorder by reducing the risk of opioid 
overdose and associated mortality.  Specifically, MATs dampen consumer cravings for opiates 
and symptoms of opioid withdrawal, making cessation easier and less risky for patients.  Patients 
also typically receive MATs as a part of a more comprehensive treatment program, which 
commonly includes detoxification and counseling-based services. Treatment with MATs is often 
long-term, having a baseline recommendation of at least 12 months. 
There are three distinct classes of MATs based on their primary active ingredient: 
methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone.  Methadone is unique because it is only delivered in 
a controlled setting under physician supervision once per day.  Physician supervision is required 
when prescribing methadone because it is a full opioid agonist, and can therefore be abused by 
patients, given its euphoric effects.  Buprenorphine is a partial opioid agonist and is therefore 
permitted to be prescribed for use at home as its euphoric effects are moderate relative to 
Methadone.  Unlike Buprenorphine and Methadone, Naltrexone blocks opioid receptors instead 
of activating them to reduce cravings.  Naltrexone can be delivered either through a long-lasting 
injection in a physician's office once a month or daily in a tablet form at home. However, 
Naltrexone reduces tolerance to other opioids, and so those who discontinue Naltrexone 
treatment and subsequently relapse may be at higher risk of overdose.   
Suboxone is a buprenorphine-based MAT, which includes Naloxone as a secondary 
active ingredient.  Naloxone is used in conjunction with buprenorphine to dampen the euphoric 
effects and prevent misuse.  However, the buprenorphine component remains effective in 
preventing withdrawal and cravings, the primary purpose of MAT.  The combination of these 
factors is why Suboxone has become a prevalent treatment option for patients with opioid use 
disorder, especially in Medicare, where opioid use disorder is common.   
Opioid use and opioid use disorder are common in Medicare.  In 2016, providers wrote 
79.4 million opioid prescriptions for Medicare beneficiaries, and around 500,000 beneficiaries 
were at risk of opioid use disorder due to their opioid use (Department of Health & Human 
Services, 2017).  The high rate of opioid use disorder in conjunction with a highly vulnerable 
population makes Medicare beneficiaries an important population to study the health 
consequences stemming from the Suboxone product hop.  Therefore, this study will estimate the 
effects of the Suboxone product hop on patient health using a population of Medicare fee-for-
service (FFS) beneficiaries.   
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Section 2: Product Hopping 
A product hop is when a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer develops a modified version 
of an existing medication that they sell (i.e., reformulation) and then acts to switch patients and 
prescribers to the new product just before generic entry.  By the time the generics finally enter 
the market, most patients are already taking the new product and do not substitute again.  
Further, pharmacies cannot automatically replace the new product with the generic for the 
original product due to chemical differences (i.e., non-bioequivalent).  In some cases, the 
reformulated product offer additional clinical benefits.  However, even when clinical benefits are 
marginal, physicians may still prescribe the line-extended product over the generic for the 
originator if they are unaware of generic entry.  Physicians may also be under the false 
impression that the reformulated product is superior due to the brand manufacturer's false 
marketing claims used to facilitate the product hop.  Therefore, regardless of added clinical 
benefit of the line-extension, patients are often prescribed the reformulated product for years 
after the originator's generics have entered.    
The most common way a brand manufacturer transitions demand in a product hop is by 
increasing the old product's price and investing heavily in promoting the new product.  This 
behavior is referred to in the product hop literature as a "soft hop," which contrasts with a "hard 
hop," where the brand discontinues the originator entirely so that providers can no longer 
prescribe it (Carrier and Shadowen, 2016).  In the case of Suboxone, Reckitt did both.  First, 
Reckitt soft hopped by detailing physicians and raising the tablet price in the period before 
generic entry to make it less affordable relative to the film.  Reckitt then “hard hopped” by 
discontinuing Suboxone tablet and their buprenorphine-based Subutex tablet to increase the 
market share of Suboxone Film further.   
The particular legal antitrust justifications of product hopping vary case by case. Still, 
they follow the general notion that in the absence of either a hard or soft product hop that 
generics would enter the market unimpeded and lower market prices rapidly (Carrier and 
Shadowen, 2017).  However, product hopping erases demand for generics of the originator and 
subsequently disincentivizes future generic entrants.  Without additional entrants, generic price 
competition is limited, and market prices remain high. 
Strategies that delay and hinder generic market entry (i.e., strategic delay) are common in 
the pharmaceutical industry and have profound financial implications for patients and payers 
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(Shapiro, 2016).  Frank and Haffajee (2020) estimated a potential $200 million cost of the 
Suboxone product hop in Medicaid alone. Still, clinical implications of strategic delay behaviors 
are likely heterogeneous due to differences in treatment guidelines and outcomes across unique 
pharmaceutical markets.   Therefore, establishing a more general framework that can be applied 
to study health outcomes resulting from product hops could represent a valuable contribution to 
policymakers and regulators. 
Section 3: The Suboxone Product Hop 
Reckitt took several actions to facilitate the product hop and incentivize patients and 
prescribers to switch to Suboxone film  (see Appendix Table 1 for Timeline of Events).  First, 
Reckitt refused to negotiate with generics to produce a Single Shared Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategy (SSRS).  Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) are guidelines 
developed by pharmaceutical manufacturers to protect population health by establishing 
consumption, prescribing, and distribution practices for patients, physicians, and manufacturers. 
As a policy, the FDA requires that any originator drug with a REMS develop an SSRS with 
entering generics before generic approval. In anticipation, Reckitt filed for a REMS for 
Suboxone tablet just six months before generics entered.  Reckitt then refused to cooperate with 
the generic Suboxone tablet manufacturers to establish an SSRS for nine months, arguing that 
their REMS was proprietary.  In the end, generic manufacturers submitted their own REMS 
separately from Reckitt, which the FDA ultimately approved. 
As the generic manufacturers worked to provide the FDA with a REMS, Reckitt 
submitted a Citizen Petition to the FDA to create an additional delay in generic competitors' 
approval.  A Citizen Petition is a formal notice sent by any member of the public (individual or 
organization) to the FDA that requests their specific action regarding a raised concern.  In the 
case of Suboxone, Reckitt claimed that it had found pediatric exposure risks with its tablet 
products nearly seven years after they had started selling them.  They further claimed that these 
risks were so significant that it required the immediate discontinuation of Suboxone tablet and 
the rejection of all generic tablet applicants.  
Note that by filing the Citizen Petition, Reckitt triggered an FDA statute that forced the 
FDA to investigate and respond with a detailed analysis within 150 days.  Even though the FDA 
has rejected 92% of Citizen Petitions filed by brand pharmaceutical manufacturers in the six 
months before generic entry, Citizen Petition filing is typical among brand manufacturers 
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(Carrier, 2018).  The FDA typically will not approve additional generics until it issues its 
investigative report, and so the mere filing guarantees at least some approval delay.  The FDA 
reviewed Reckitt's claims for five months before rejecting them and then approved generic 
Suboxone tablet manufacturers for entry on the same day.  By the time generics entered the 
market in February 2013, Reckitt had already converted over 70% of their tablet sales to film 
(Suboxone Complaint, 2015). 
In response to the Citizen Petition, the FDA reached out to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to investigate potential antitrust abuses.  After review, a plethora of federal 
and state prosecutors sued Reckitt for defrauding the FDA and violating the Sherman Antitrust 
Act by unduly preventing competition from generics.  The resulting litigation ultimately settled 
for $1.4 billion in July 2019, making it one of the largest ever opioid-related settlements 
(Department of Justice, 2019). Still, the litigation and subsequent literature on this topic have 
focused primarily on the case's financial and legal implications and have not fully explored 
population health consequences.  Filling in the knowledge gap of how the Suboxone product hop 
affected patient health outcomes remains essential.  The Suboxone product hop and its effect on 
product use and pricing may be associated with the U.S. Opioid Epidemic's severity. 
To summarize, the purpose of this research is to determine how the Suboxone product 
hop may have affected patient health during a critical period of growth in the U.S. opioid crisis 
between 2010–2017.  This study will also guide policymakers and regulators responding to 
product hopping cases in other markets by establishing an empirical framework that can 
determine their effects on patient outcomes.  The study used a population of Medicare 
beneficiaries to evaluate this framework and assess the Suboxone product hop's practical 
significance due to the high opioid use disorder rates. 
 
ESTIMATION 
The study used the following estimation framework to determine the Suboxone product 
hop effect on adverse opioid events (i.e., opioid overdose, abuse, and withdrawal).  First, I 
estimated empirical demand using a mixed-effects logistic regression choice model based on 
Hole (2013), which uses maximum simulated likelihood estimation.  I then generated 
counterfactual choice probabilities by modifying the covariates' coding, and the availability of 
the products in patient choice sets to reflect the most plausible outcome in the absence of the 
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product hop.  In particular, I assumed that had the product hop never occurred that Brand 
Suboxone film would not have entered the market and that generic Suboxone tablet would have 
entered in May 2012.  Reckitt would have also likely decided to continue selling Suboxone and 
Subutex tablets, which it discontinued to support a transition to Suboxone film in September 
2012.  However, due to the minimal use of Subutex and brand products when a generic is 
covered by a Part D plan (Verma, 2020), extending Suboxone and Subutex availability would not 
significantly impact any findings. 
After generating predicted product choice probabilities under the counterfactual, I 
estimated a discrete-time survival model with competing risks to relate treatment use by product 
over time to adverse opioid events.  I then replaced the observed treatment decisions with 
counterfactual choice probabilities to produce approximations of adverse opioid events in the 
counterfactual.  Finally, I calculated the product hop effect by taking the difference between the 
total adverse opioid event probabilities in the counterfactual and the total observed adverse 
opioid events.   
Demand 
 A mixed-effect logistic regression model, often referred to as a discrete choice model 
with random coefficients, estimated MAT demand.  the discrete choice model also predicted 
counterfactual demand using both individual preferences and resulting changes to them due to 
the product hop and additional generic entry.  It also captured the product's observable and 
unobservable aspects that affected decision-making by incorporating product fixed effects and 
time-varying product characteristic covariates (e.g., price).  In general, discrete choice models 
have an advantage over more traditional multinomial logistic regression choice models. The 
multinomial logistic regression model can only model the contribution of subject-specific 
attributes to the probability of selecting a particular product, while mixed-effect logistics 
regression models can incorporate product characteristics and consumer characteristics.  Further, 
mixed-effect logistics regression can accommodate random coefficients, such as a random price 
coefficient that can account for heterogeneity in patient price sensitivity.  More generally, 
demand for MAT products is a function of variation in product pricing, product quality, fixed 
product characteristics, and shocks from new product entry and MAT policy changes.  Therefore, 
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4       𝑖𝑓 "𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒"
5       𝑖𝑓 "𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑜𝑛𝑒"
 
The outcome, 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡, was an indicator equal to one for the selected product k in some 
decision for patient i in month t. Out-of-pocket price, 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑡, represented the out-of-pocket patient-
specific price for a one-day supply of the medication and was estimated using a random 
coefficient 𝛼𝑖.  Product-specific fixed-effects, 𝑘, captured the unobserved (to the 
econometrician) quality and preferences across individual products. Previous choice 
dummies 𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡−1 indicated the last product choice by a patient in the prior month.  𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑡 
identified the period after the Suboxone film entry while 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 qualified the period 
after Suboxone tablet generic entry.  Individual year fixed-effects, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡 separately identified 
the effects of the event timing indicators from other MAT demand shocks that occurred over the 
same period.  I controlled for patient characteristics 𝑥𝑖𝑡, to address demographic and health 
differences that affect demand across MAT products.  Finally, 𝑖𝑘𝑡 was an extreme value type II 
independent and identically distrusted (iid) error term. 
Mixed effect logistic discrete choice models require that independent variables vary 
within each choice to identify parameter estimates.  However, patient characteristics and product 
entry do not vary within each decision.  Therefore, I interacted the product hop timing and lag 
choice indicators with the product fixed effects, which varied within choice by construction.  
These interactions had the added benefit of revealing specifically how product entry and patients' 
previous selections shifted the demand for individual products in the current choice, in addition 
to controlling for patient choice inertia (i.e., persistence) and substitution patterns.  I also set 
patient characteristics and year-fixed effects to 0 for the “No Drug” choice alternatives.  This 
modification allowed for estimating how these factors contributed to choice at the extensive 
margin (i.e., the probability of selecting any drug as opposed to no drug). 
Health 
A discrete-time competing risk survival model (Gibbons, R.D. et al., 2003) determined 
the association between treatment by product and adverse opioid events.  This model was 
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selected instead of the standard Cox proportional hazards model because it permitted the use of 
time-varying treatment covariates needed to connect the discrete choice model to the adverse 
opioid event model in the counterfactual analysis.  It also had the added benefit of allowing for 
all-cause mortality to be estimated separately (i.e., as a competing risk), given that mortality 
(unrelated to overdose) potentially obfuscates the observation of future adverse opioid events.  In 
particular, I specified the probability of experiencing an adverse opioid event as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑑𝑖1𝑡 +⋯+ 𝛿5𝑑𝑖5𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑏 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   [2] 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑁𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡"
1, 𝑖𝑓 "𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡"
2, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦"
 
The outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, a categorical variable set to zero, one, or two based on some patient i 
experiencing no event, an adverse opioid event, or mortality in month t.  𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡={𝑑𝑖1𝑡, . . . , 𝑑𝑖5𝑡} 
were indicators used to represent treatment with one of the five MAT products. Patient-level 
control variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, controlled for variation in risk related to patient characteristics.  The 
baseline hazard function was specified using month dummies, 𝛼𝑡, which were normalized around 
the index treatment month (e.g. -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, where 0 is the index treatment month).  
Finally, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 was an iid error term.   
Counterfactuals 
I describe the counterfactual framework used to determine the Suboxone product hop's 
net effect on adverse opioid events below.  First, I estimated empirical MAT product demand 
using model [1]. Covariates were then modified to mimic the counterfactual assumptions.  
Specifically, I assumed that the FDA blocked the product hop by rejecting the Suboxone film 
New Drug Application (NDA).  I also assumed that without the film's approval, Reckitt would 
not have acted to delay generic entry by filing a Citizen Petition and refusing to negotiate an 
SSRS with generic manufacturers.  Therefore, I made the following changes before predicting 
product choice probabilities from the demand model: 1) I added generic Suboxone tablet as a 
choice between May 2012 and February 2013, 2) I set 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑘𝑡 set to 0 for all observations, 
3) I set 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑡  to one for observations that occurred after the generic Suboxone 
tablet's earlier entry in May 2012, and 4) I removed brand Suboxone film from all beneficiary 
choice sets.  Note that May 2012 was the expected generic entry date but for the product hop 
(Suboxone Complaint, 2015), while February 2013 was the observed generic entry date. 
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Prices also had to be imputed for the earlier entering generic Suboxone tablet in the 
counterfactuals.  As a first attempt, I fixed the generic tablet's out-of-pocket price during its 
hypothetical earlier entry period to the average price in the first year of its observed entry.  
However, additional generic tablet manufacturers would have likely entered the market without 
the product hop, leading to fiercer price competition.  Therefore, I conducted a second 
counterfactual to account for the likelihood of additional generic entry.  In particular, I obtained 
approximations for generic price decay in the months following entry using estimates from 
Berndt & Aitken (2011). They found an average price decline of 23% in the first six months after 
generic entry, 50% at the end of the first year, and 77% after two years.  Consequently, in the 
second counterfactual, I decreased generic prices by 4% a month until month 6, 4.5% a month 
between months 6 and 12, and 2.25% each month between months 12 and 24.    
Next, I estimated the counterfactual adverse opioid event probabilities by replacing 
observed product choices with the counterfactual choice probabilities from equation [1]: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡(?̂?𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝐸[𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1)|?̂?𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡1, … , ?̂?𝑖𝑡5] = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝛿1?̂?𝑖𝑡1 +⋯+ 𝛿5?̂?𝑖𝑡5 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕?̂? + 𝑣𝑖𝑡      [3] 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 represented predictions of adverse opioid events from equation [2] after replacing 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑘  
with ?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑘 estimated from equation [1] under each counterfactual.  Aggregating the ?̂?𝑖𝑡 from 
equation [3] across patients and time calculated the total number of counterfactual adverse opioid 
events:   




𝑡=1       [4] 
Finally, the difference between observed outcomes and estimated outcomes from equation [4] 
determined the effect of the Suboxone product hop on adverse opioid events: 
𝛥𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑝 = 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 − 𝐴𝑂?̂?𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙        [5] 
 
DATA 
To study the product hop effect, I needed information regarding patient MAT treatment 
use and related health outcomes throughout the study period.. Medicare claims data sufficiently 
captured this information, and in particular contained details surrounding each patient’sMAT use 
and opioid use disorder outcomes over time.  Ideally, one would also directly observe the 
consumption of MATs instead of written prescriptions to ensure compliance.  Further, it is 
possible some outcomes that did not result in a visit with physician may be unobserved. 
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However, The medical consequences of opioid use disorder frequently require medical attention, 
which reduces the likelihood that the primary outcome, adverse opioid events went unobserved.   
Study Population 
The study population started with a random 20% sample of patients in the universe of 
Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries.  This sample included the elderly and patients under 65 
entitled to Medicare through disability or End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD), and excluded the 
Medicare Advantage population due to unobserved outcomes in this population.  ICD9 and 
ICD10 medical diagnosis codes for opioid use dependence (see Appendix Table 2) then 
identified a baseline sample of 325,520 individual beneficiaries between 2010–2017. There were 
60,982 beneficiaries receiving MAT at some point during the study period, and 264,528 
observed without treatment.  
Beneficiaries with opioid use disorder typically vary over their willingness to receive 
treatment and over their access to treatment. One initial concern was that individuals might select 
into MAT treatment based on particular innate characteristics distinct from those that abstain. 
Therefore, I restricted the beneficiary sample to include only beneficiaries who had at least one 
visit with an MAT prescribing physician. Visits with a prescribing physician could signal of an 
individual's willingness to initiate MAT treatment. 
From this remaining sample of 60,982 MAT treated and 195,197 untreated Medicare 
beneficiaries, I constructed a patient-month longitudinal panel wherein every beneficiary had the 
option to either receive treatment with a particular product or forego treatment each month 
following their opioid use disorder diagnosis.  In particular, a beneficiary could choose between 
brand Suboxone film, brand Suboxone tablet, generic Suboxone tablet, "Other" buprenorphine 
(e.g., Zubsolv, Subutex, Bunavail), naltrexone, or no drug.  Note that methadone was excluded as 
a choice as it is only used in the office setting to treat opioid use disorder. Each beneficiary in the 
sample was then followed from their index opioid use disorder diagnosis and censored after 
death.  In the survival model, I also censored beneficiaries after the first incidence of an adverse 
opioid event.   
Outcomes  
I measured MAT product demand using a binary choice indicator set to one for the 
selected alternative in each month. Note that I restricted the set of possible alternatives to only 
the products covered on each patient's Medicare Part D plan. In particular, I considered a 
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particular product covered by a patient's plan in a given year if paid for by Medicare at least once 
among any patient in that plan for the year of observation.  I identified MAT products from the 
Medicare Part D claims data using NDC codes produced by the Department of Health and 
Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (see Appendix 
Table 3). 
The study used two other outcomes; adverse opioid events and all-cause mortality.  I 
estimated these outcomes simultaneously using a competing risks discrete-time survival model 
(Efron, 1988). I used a categorical variable representing the occurrence of no event (0), an 
adverse opioid event (1), or mortality (2).  The Medicare Beneficiary Summary file included the 
exact date of death for each included beneficiary in the sample, if available.  I identified adverse 
opioid events using a set of ICD9 and ICD10 codes for opioid poisoning (i.e., overdose), abuse, 
and adverse effects (see Appendix Table 4).   
Covariates 
The key independent variables in the product demand model captured new product entry 
in the MAT market.  Specifically, I included indicators representing the period following the 
launch of Suboxone film and generic entry to estimate the effect of their entry on demand.  I set 
the generic entry indicator to one on or after February 23, 2013, to reflect the generics' observed 
entry date. I then assigned the Suboxone film entry indicator to one on or after August 30, 2010, 
the date it entered the market.  Year fixed-effects allowed for these event indicators to be 
separately identified from unique demand shocks over time.  Demand shocks could stem from 
policy changes over time, such as the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 that 
drastically expanded the use of MATs (114th U.S. Congress, 2016). 
 Next, I controlled for patient price sensitivity for using patient out-of-pocket price in the 
demand model.  I calculated the patient's out-of-pocket price for a single-day supply of a selected 
medication by dividing the patient's paid amount for a prescription by the total days supplied on 
the prescription. However, I did not observe the unchosen alternative MAT prices..  To 
approximated these prices, I constructed a measure of patient payment liability that I multiplied 
by the total drug cost.  Note that the patient payment liability in a given month was calculated by 
dividing the patient's paid amount for their observed choice by  the gross cost.  However, when a 
patient did not receive a prescription in a month, the patient payment liability was not 
identifiable.  In these instances, I used the average out-of-pocket prices for alternatives paid by 
14 
 
other beneficiaries in the same plan in the same month instead.  These prices reflected the 
marginal beneficiary's cost in the same plan at the same point in the year. 
Patient demographics, ancillary treatment, and medical histories were incorporated into 
the empirical models to address demand heterogeneity over individual characteristics.  Specific 
controls included age, race and ethnicity, gender, Medicaid dual eligibility status, and disability.  
I also added an indicator representing the presence of comorbid mental illness. It was set to one 
if the patient had a mood disorder, personality disorder, schizophrenia, childhood behavioral 
disorder, or dementia.  Further, ancillary mental health and substance use disorder treatment is 
commonly delivered in conjunction with MAT treatment and was captured in the survival model 
using an indicator representing a patient receiving any of the following services in the previous 
three months: psychotherapy, case management, consultation, drug testing, detox, and 
community mental health services.  I obtained all patient characteristics, treatment, and medical 
histories from Medicare MedPAR inpatient claim files, carrier/professional claims files, 
outpatient claims files, and the Medicare beneficiary summary files (MBSF). 
Finally, the study modeled persistence and substitution in product demand using previous 
choice indicators interacted with the product fixed-effects.  This framework importantly allowed 
for estimating how a patient's last choice shifted the choice probability for a specific alternative 
in the current decision.  Note that demand is highly persistent in the MAT market, given that 
treatment gaps can lead to patient relapse and severe withdrawal symptoms. 
RESULTS 
The product hop enabled Reckitt to capture substantial market share for Suboxone film in 
Medicare between 2010-2017 (see Figure 1). The transition from brand Suboxone tablet to 
Suboxone film is highly apparent in the few months before generic entry, given the rate at which 
Suboxone tablet prescriptions fell while Suboxone film prescriptions increased.  Total 
prescriptions for other MAT products were consistently much lower, including generic Suboxone 
tablet, which had comparable use with Naltrexone and all Other Buprenorphine product 
categories.  Note further that prescriptions of all MAT products increased over time, reflecting 
the provider response's evolution to the growing severity of the opioid epidemic during this 
period. 
The main results show the product hop's effect on product pricing in the MAT market 
between 2010-2017 (see Figure 2). The most critical finding was that while the generic 
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Suboxone price declined, it did so much more gradually and moderately than under traditional 
generic entry.  The results also confirm Reckitt's scheme to make the film more economical 
relative to the tablet to facilitate the switch.  More clearly, the price of the brand Suboxone tablet 
increased in the period before generic entry to be consistently higher than the price of Suboxone 
film.  On the contrary, the total cost per day supply of the other buprenorphine product category 
declined over time, reflecting additional generic entry and price competition.  Note further that 
the price of naltrexone and Suboxone film was relatively constant over the entire study period. 
Characteristics varied widely between MAT treated and untreated beneficiaries in the 
study sample (see Table 1). Treated beneficiaries were more likely to be younger, Medicaid dual 
eligible, and disabled than untreated beneficiaries.  They also had lower comorbid mental illness 
rates but received more ancillary mental health and substance use disorder treatment.  Further, 
treated beneficiaries had lower rates of adverse opioid events, supporting MATs being 
efficacious therapies for opioid use disorder.  There was also a noticeably lower proportion of 
women and black beneficiaries receiving treatment.   
The study sample beneficiaries were very price-sensitive on average, given the large, 
negative, and statistically significant mean estimates of the random coefficient for the patient 
out-of-pocket price covariate (see Table 2).  They also greatly varied in their degree of price 
sensitivity, given the large and significant estimate of the random coefficient's standard 
deviation.  These findings were consistent with the existing literature on price sensitivity in the 
MAT market (McClellan, 2019). 
Product entry related to the product hop also played an essential role in determining MAT 
demand.  In particular, after Suboxone film launched, the odds a beneficiary utilized either the 
brand Suboxone tablet or Other Buprenorphine declined significantly.  However, after generic 
Suboxone tablet entry, only a considerable reduction in use was observed for brand Suboxone 
tablet.  This finding highlights the extent to which the product hop was effective in preventing 
generic penetration.  Estimates of the product fixed effects, which capture demand across 
products before either generic or film entry, were primarily large, negative, and significant.  
These estimates likely result from the high rate of "No Drug" choices among the study sample's 
untreated beneficiaries.   
There was heterogeneity in MAT demand across beneficiary characteristics (see Table 2).  
Racial disparities in MAT prescribing are well documented (Pro et al., 2020), which I attempted 
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to address by using race and ethnicity indicators.  Beneficiaries receiving ancillary mental health 
and substance use disorder treatment, and beneficiaries with mental health conditions and other 
substance use disorders, had higher odds of MAT treatment.  The more frequent encounters with 
providers capable of prescribing MATs among this population may explain this result.  Disabled 
and Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries also had higher odds of receiving MAT treatment.  This 
may be related to the high rates of chronic illness in the Medicare population, which often 
require treatment with opioids (Lauer, Henly, and Brucker, 2019).  It may also be related to 
additional social risk factors in this population (MACPAC, 2017). 
 Finally, the demand model's previous choice parameter estimates confirmed strong 
persistence in MAT demand (see Appendix Table 5).  Note that the positive, large, and 
statistically significant estimates suggested that beneficiaries who chose a particular product in 
their previous choice were much more likely to choose it again than a different product or no 
treatment at all.  The model also correctly identified substitution as occurring primarily within 
the active ingredient.  For example, those who chose a buprenorphine-based product in their last 
choice were more likely to select a buprenorphine product in their current choice than a 
Naltrexone product, and vice versa.   
 MATs are highly efficacious drugs with modest variation in their efficacy, demonstrated 
by the treatment effect estimates from the discrete-time survival model with competing risks (see 
Table 3).  The log hazard estimates for each MAT product category were negative, large in 
magnitude, and statistically significant.  However, the most crucial finding was that Suboxone 
tablet products were more efficacious than Suboxone film given the larger negative estimates for 
the brand and generic tablet indicators.  Therefore, in theory, beneficiary substitution to 
Suboxone film due to the product hop should worsen patient health.  Further, these estimates 
were consistent with related estimates from MAT literature (Bao et al., 2019).  The complete set 
of results from this model are shown in the Appendix (see Appendix Tables 6.A. & 6.B). 
Next, I compared counterfactual product market shares with the observed product market 
shares in the periods before and after generic entry (see Table 4).  Note that the market share of 
"No Drug" was smaller in the counterfactuals after generic entry, suggesting that broader 
availability of the less expensive generic products motivated additional treatment initiation.  The 
even lower share for "No Drug" in the second counterfactual where generic prices declined more 
steeply also supports this finding.  Interestingly, the market share of "No Drug" also declined 
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before generic entry in the counterfactuals.  This finding could be related to changes in patient 
and provider perceptions in the quality of the tablet after film entry due to the FDA Citizen's 
petition suggesting risks of pediatric exposure with the tablets.  It may also relate to greater 
adherence to Suboxone tablet products relative to the film.  This is evidenced by the higher 
proportion of patients switching off treatment after being prescribed Suboxone film relative to 
the Suboxone tablet products (see Appendix Table 7).   
 Finally, predicted adverse opioid events from the counterfactuals were compared with the 
observed (see Table 5).  I observed a total of 18,932 adverse opioid events in the sample during 
the entire study period.  Since each patient could only have one adverse opioid event in the 
study, 18,932 also represented the number of beneficiaries with one or more adverse opioid 
events.  Adverse opioid events then declined to 17,112 in the first counterfactual without film 
entry and 16,930 in the second counterfactual without film entry and lowered generic prices.  
This result implies that the product hop increased the number of beneficiaries with one or more 
adverse opioid events by 9.6-10.6%.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 The Suboxone product hop successfully delayed the entry and penetration of generic 
competitors.  Consequently, a higher proportion of patients received treatment with Suboxone 
film, which is less efficacious than Suboxone tablet.  It also decreased MAT treatment overall by 
sustaining high prices in the MAT market.  Hence, had policymakers or regulators blocked the 
product hop, the number of patients with one or more adverse opioid events would have declined 
by between 9.6%-10.6% between 2010-2017.  Generalizing these changes to the entire opioid 
use disorder population in the U.S. translates to thousands of preventable adverse opioid events.  
Therefore, the Suboxone product hop played an essential role in the severity of the opioid 
epidemic, which continues to be a top public health concern in the U.S.  
 The results suggest that policymakers and regulators should act swiftly to block instances 
of product hopping.  Product hopping has significant effects on the use and pricing of products in 
pharmaceutical markets and can lead to the promotion and adoption of potentially worse 
treatment options. Frank and Haffajee (2020) provide several suggestions to reform health care 
policy to make product hopping less attractive and more challenging for brand manufacturers.  In 
particular, they suggest requiring FDA review of the incremental value of product line extensions 
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before listing them in the FDA Orange Book.  Suppose the FDA only found minimal clinical 
benefit associated with the new product. In that case, the FDA could withhold listing the new 
product in the Orange Book, which would allow automatic reformulation substitution for the 
originator's generic at the point of sale in the pharmacy.  Frank and Haffajee (2020) also suggest 
requiring periods either before or after generic entry where no reformulation can receive FDA 
approval, removing the incentive and ability among brands to engage in product hopping.  This 
study shows that these policies would significantly improve population health relative to the 
current post-hoc litigation approach to deterrence. 
 Despite statistically significant findings, the study design’s internal validity is threatened 
by several factors.  The first threat concerns the construction of the out-of-pocket price variable.  
Although I attempted to adjust out-of-pocket prices of alternatives for cost-sharing, patient 
payment liabilities will realistically differ by product due to their varied positions in plan 
formularies, which were unobserved.  Similarly, using the plan average out-of-pocket price for 
an alternative when a patient selected no drug is problematic, given that it assumes that patients 
were all at the same point in their deductible in a given month.  Moreover, I made several 
assumptions to interpolate prices in the counterfactuals instead of estimating them directly 
through a supply-side model that could relate product prices to use.  While findings in the 
generic entry literature supported some of these pricing assumptions, manufacturers in the MAT 
market are not necessarily representative of manufacturers in the marginal pharmaceutical 
market.  To the extent that prices suffer from measurement error, predicted choice probabilities 
central to recovering health effects would be more conservative. 
 In addition to measurement issues in the out-of-pocket price covariate, price may also be 
endogenous.  Price is commonly endogenous in choice models due to how product quality 
affects both prices and demand.  However, the benefit of studying pharmaceutical markets is that 
one can exploit price variation between subjects in different plans that charge different amounts 
for the same drugs.  While this additional variation helps with identification, it is not entirely 
sufficient to ensure no price endogeneity.   
 There is also minimal consideration given to potential changes in plan coverage of 
different MAT products without the product hop.  For example, I assumed that the same plans 
that covered the film would have covered the generic tablet in the period between the earlier 
counterfactual generic entry date and the observed generic entry date.  This assumption is 
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unlikely to be completely accurate, particularly during the several months following generic 
entry when plan coverage will be minimal.  More plans would have also covered the brand 
Suboxone tablet if Reckitt had not discontinued it to facilitate the product hop.  Hence, 
counterfactual coverage in Part D Medicare Plans may bias the counterfactual choice probability 
estimates to favor the generic. 
 Although not technically a limitation, the use of adverse opioid events instead of opioid 
related mortality leaves additional questions surrounding the effect of this antitrust event on the 
severity of the US Opioid Epidemic.  Given that not all adverse events are fatal, the true impact 
of this event on lives lost remains an important consideration.  However, even if only 20% of 
these events ended in a fatality, the net effect of the product hop on mortality would be 
substantial due to the large number of opioid overdose deaths across the US during the study 
period.  Future research should estimate this effect directly by incorporating death certificate data 
that specify deaths related to overdose, for example. 
 Finally, findings in Medicare may not generalize to patients with other insurance types.  
Medicare is a unique environment for substance use disorder due to many patients having 
chronic medical conditions requiring treatment with opiates.  Medicare can also have less 
generous pharmaceutical coverage than other insurance programs due to the infamous coverage 
donut hole in Part D plans.  Hence, demand estimates for products may not translate well to 
different insurance settings where coverage is more generous, and chronic illness and disability 
rates are lower.  Still, 70% of the study population was Medicaid dual-eligible (see Table 1), 
making these findings relevant to Medicaid. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Reckitt's product hop of Suboxone tablet to Suboxone Film increased adverse opioid 
events in Medicare.  This finding is due to the resulting decrease in treatment use and patient 
substitution from the more efficacious Suboxone tablet products to the less efficacious Suboxone 
film product.  Specifically, without the Suboxone product hop, the estimated adverse opioid 
event would have declined by roughly 10%.  This reduction represents tens of thousands of 
preventable adverse opioid events in the general opioid use disorder population. More generally, 
to improve population health, policymakers and regulators should act aggressively to prevent 
future instances of product hopping.  The FDA should carefully review the added clinical benefit 
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of any brand line extensions seeking FDA approval in the period before generic entry or delay 
approval until after generics have entered for the original product.  Doing so may remove the 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
 
Table 1.1. Comparison of Characteristics in Medication-Assisted Treated vs. Control 
Populations 
 
Description Treated Control 
Total Beneficiaries (N) 60,348 195,197 
Abuse Rate (%) 16.2% 24.3% 
Medicaid Dual Eligible (%) 52.7% 45.8% 
Disabled (%) 84.8% 69.4% 
Comorbid Mental Health or  
Substance Use Disorder (%) 
88.0% 98.2% 
Ancillary Mental Health or Substance Use 
Disorder Treatment Use (%) 
71.0% 66.0% 
Age (Mean) 55 63 
Gender 
       Male (%) 51.3% 41.4% 
       Female (%) 48.7% 58.6% 
Race/Ethnicity 
       White (%) 84.9% 81.3% 
       Black (%) 9.1% 13.4% 
       Other Race (%) 2.4% 2.5% 
       Hispanic (%) 3.6% 2.8% 

























Table 1.2. Parameter Estimates from Medication-Assisted Treatment Product Demand 
Model 
   




      Out-Of-Pocket Price (MEAN) -9.47 0.15 0.00 -9.77 -9.18 
      Out-Of-Pocket Price (STDDEV) 9.15 0.15 0.00 8.86 9.44 
Entry Film 
      EntryFilm X Brand Suboxone Tablet 
FE -1.41 0.07 0.00 -1.55 -1.28 
      EntryFilm X Naltrexone FE -0.68 0.06 0.00 -0.80 -0.55 
      EntryFilm X Other Buprenorphine FE -0.70 0.14 0.00 -0.97 -0.43 
Entry Generic 
      EntryGeneric X Suboxone Film FE -0.45 0.19 0.02 -0.83 -0.07 
      EntryGeneric X Brand Suboxone 
Tablet FE -2.89 0.23 0.00 -3.34 -2.44 
      EntryGeneric X Other Buprenorphine 
FE -0.40 0.21 0.05 -0.80 0.00 
      EntryGeneric X Naltrexone FE -0.59 0.19 0.00 -0.97 -0.21 
Product Fixed Effects 
      Suboxone Film FE -1.33 0.13 0.00 -1.58 -1.08 
      Brand Suboxone Tablet FE 0.79 0.13 0.00 0.54 1.04 
      Generic Suboxone Tablet FE -4.00 0.23 0.00 -4.46 -3.54 
      Other Buprenorphine FE -2.93 0.17 0.00 -3.26 -2.59 
      Naltrexone FE -2.25 0.13 0.00 -2.50 -2.01 
Patient Characteristics 
      Comorbid Mental Health Condition -0.25 0.06 0.00 -0.36 -0.13 
      Age -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
      Black -0.41 0.05 0.00 -0.51 -0.31 
      Hispanic 0.01 0.07 0.89 -0.12 0.14 
      Other Race/Ethnicity -0.13 0.11 0.22 -0.34 0.08 
      Disabled -0.06 0.05 0.23 -0.16 0.04 
      Dual Eligible 1.09 0.04 0.00 1.02 1.17 
      Female -0.01 0.03 0.76 -0.07 0.05 
Notes: Estimates are expressed as log-odds ratios.  The full table of estimates is presented in Appendix Table 5 (e.g., previous 
choice interactions with fixed effects). Estimates were obtained using mixed-effect logistic regression.  STDDEV is the standard 








Table 1.3. Effect of Medication-Assisted Treatments on Adverse Opioid Events 
 
Covariate Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Brand Suboxone Tablet -1.24 0.09 0.00 -1.42 -1.05 
Generic Suboxone Tablet -1.23 0.12 0.00 -1.46 -0.99 
Brand Suboxone Film -0.96 0.05 0.00 -1.05 -0.87 
Other Buprenorphine -1.02 0.12 0.00 -1.25 -0.79 
Other Naltrexone -1.96 0.12 0.00 -2.18 -1.73 
Note: Coefficients are in terms of log-hazards.  The model was estimated using a discrete-time survival model with competing 
risks, in which mortality was treated as the competing risk.  Presented estimates use adverse opioid events as the outcome. See 



































Table 1.4.  Observed vs. Counterfactual Medication-Assisted Treatment Product Market 






























No Drug 76.11% 64.82% 66.97% 56.93% 54.33% 
Brand Suboxone Film 4.03% - 18.38% - - 
Brand Suboxone 
Tablet 
13.86% 26.18% 0.86% 1.22% 1.22% 
Generic Suboxone 
Tablet 
- - 3.47% 31.41% 34.04% 
Other Buprenorphine 1.19% 2.71% 3.54% 3.07% 3.01% 
Naltrexone 4.79% 6.28% 6.76% 7.38% 7.39% 
Note: Pre-generic entry reflects January 2010 – April 2012.  Post Generic entry reflects May 2012 – December 2017.  The "-" 



































Adverse Opioid  
Events 
Observed 18,932 0 0.00% 
Counterfactual #1: No Film Entry 17,112 1,820 -9.62% 
Counterfactual #2: No Film Entry & Additional 
Generic Entry 16,930 2,002 -10.58% 






























Figure 1.1. Total Prescriptions by Medication-Assisted Treatment Product by Month 
 
 
Source: Medicare Part D Claims Data 














Figure 1.2. Average Total Cost Per Day Supplied by Medication-Assisted Treatment 
Product by Month 
 
Source: Medicare Part D Claims Data 












Appendix Table 1.1. Suboxone Product Hop Timeline of Key Events 
 
Date Event Description 
10/8/2002 
Suboxone (Buprenorphine/Naloxone) is granted FDA approval. It is given seven 
years of exclusivity as an orphan drug as patents on the active ingredients of 
Suboxone had previously expired.  
10/21/2008 Reckitt Files its New Drug Application (NDA) for Suboxone film. 
5/8/2009 
Two generic manufacturers file Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) 
for generic suboxone tablets 
10/8/2009 Original expiration date for Suboxone tablet. 
8/30/2010 FDA approves Suboxone Film. 
11/1/2011 
Reckitt files a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Suboxone 
tablet.   
12/22/2011 FDA approves Reckitt's REMS for Suboxone tablet.   
1/6/2012 
FDA advises Reckitt and impending generic manufacturers of the need for a 
joint REMS (Single Shared REMS (SSRS) program).  FDA demands 
compliance of request for joint REMS by Reckitt on May 6.  
5/1/2012 
 Reckitt refuses to cooperate with the SSRS program development, and generics 
call meeting with the FDA to discuss the delays. 
Expected Generic Entry but-for the Product Hop. 
6/18/2012 Reckitt and generics meet with FDA to discuss delays.  
9/25/2012 
Reckitt files a Citizen Petition with the FDA arguing there existed a pediatric 
exposure "safety issue so severe as to require that the tablets be withdrawn from 
the market within the next six months."   
2/22/2013 
The FDA denies Reckitt's Citizen Petition.   
FDA waves the SSRS REMS requirement due to a lengthy negotiating period. 
FDA approves two generic manufacturer's Generic Suboxone Tablets. 
Source: Suboxone Complaint, "In RE: Suboxone Antitrust Litigation: End Payor Plaintiffs Second Consolidated Amended Class 














Appendix Table 1.2. National Drug Codes for Medication-Assisted Treatments 
 
NDC Product Name Generic Name Form Strength 
00054-0188-13 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00054-0189-13 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
00093-5720-56 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00093-5721-56 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
00228-3154-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00228-3154-73 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00228-3155-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
00228-3155-73 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
00406-1923-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00406-1924-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
00490-0051-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00490-0051-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00490-0051-60 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
00490-0051-90 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
12496-1202-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 2-0.5 
12496-1202-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 2-0.5 
12496-1204-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 4-1 
12496-1204-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 4-1 
12496-1208-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 8-2 
12496-1208-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 8-2 
12496-1212-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 12-3 
12496-1212-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 12-3 
12496-1278-02 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 2.00 
12496-1283-02 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
12496-1306-02 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
12496-1310-02 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 8.00 
16590-0666-05 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
16590-0666-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
16590-0667-05 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
16590-0667-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
16590-0667-90 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
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23490-9270-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
23490-9270-06 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
23490-9270-09 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
35356-0004-07 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
35356-0004-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
42291-0174-30 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
42291-0175-30 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
43063-0184-07 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
43063-0184-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
49999-0395-07 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
49999-0395-15 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
49999-0395-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
49999-0638-30 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 2.00 
49999-0639-30 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 8.00 
50383-0287-93 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
50383-0294-93 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
52959-0304-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
52959-0749-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
53217-0138-30 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54123-0114-30 ZUBSOLV Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 11.4-2.9 
54123-0914-30 ZUBSOLV Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 1.4-0.36 
54123-0929-30 ZUBSOLV Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2.9-0.71 
54123-0957-30 ZUBSOLV Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 5.7-1.4 
54123-0986-30 ZUBSOLV Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8.6-2.1 
54569-5496-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
54569-5739-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54569-5739-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54569-5739-02 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54569-6399-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 8-2 
54569-6408-00 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5707-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5707-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5707-02 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5707-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5707-04 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
54868-5750-00 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
55045-3784-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 





Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
55887-0312-04 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
55887-0312-15 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
59385-0012-01 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 2.1-0.3 
59385-0012-30 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 2.1-0.3 
59385-0014-01 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 4.2-0.7 
59385-0014-30 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 4.2-0.7 
59385-0016-01 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 6.3-1 
59385-0016-30 BUNAVAIL Buprenorphine/Naloxone Film 6.3-1 
63629-4028-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
63629-4034-01 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
63629-4034-02 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
63629-4034-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
63629-4092-01 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 8.00 
63874-1084-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
63874-1085-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
63874-1173-03 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 8.00 
63874-1174-03 SUBUTEX Buprenorphine Tablet 2.00 
65162-0415-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
65162-0416-03 BUPRENORPHINE-
NALOXONE 
Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
66336-0015-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
66336-0016-30 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
68071-1380-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 8-2 
68071-1510-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
68258-2999-03 SUBOXONE Buprenorphine/Naloxone Tablet 2-0.5 
63459-0300-42 VIVITROL VIVITROL Injection 380.00 
65757-0300-01 VIVITROL VIVITROL Injection 380.00 
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (2019) "Use of Medication Assisted Treatment for Opioid 
Use Disorder in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance" U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Available at: 





















ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Dependence  
304: Opioid Dependence-Unspecified 
304.01: Opioid Dependence-Continuous 
304.02: Opioid Dependence-Episodic 
304.03: Opioid Dependence, In Remission 
304.7: Opioid Other Dep-Unspecified 
304.71: Opioid Other Dep-Continuous 
304.72: Opioid Other Dep-Episodic 
304.73: Opioid Other Dep-In Remission 
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and abuse codes) 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
Women in the United States," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical Briefs. Statistical Brief #247. Available 
at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 

























ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Abuse  
305.51: Opioid Abuse-Continuous 
305.52: Opioid Abuse-Episodic 
305.53: Opioid Abuse-In Remission 
305.5: Opioid Abuse Unspecified 
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and dependence codes) 
Adverse  
Effects 
E935.2: Other opiates and related 
Narcotics Causing Adverse Effects 
in Therapeutic Use 
T40.0X5: Adverse effect of opium 
T40.2X5: Adverse effect of other opioids 
T40.3X5: Adverse effect of Methadone 
Overdose 
965: Opium Poisoning 
965.09: Poisoning by other opiates 
and related narcotics 
E850.2: Accidental poisoning by 
other opiates and related narcotics 
T40.0X1, 0X2, 0X3, 0X4: Poisoning by 
opium–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.1X1, 1X2, 1X3, 1X4: Poisoning by 
heroin–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.2X1, 2X2, 2X3, 2X4: Poisoning by other 
opioids–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.3X1, 3X2, 3X3, 3X4: Poisoning by 
Methadone–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
Women in the United States," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical Briefs. Statistical Brief #247. Available 
at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 










Appendix Table 1.5. Medication-Assisted Treatment Demand Model Estimates 
 






      Out-Of-Pocket Price (MEAN) -9.47 0.15 0.00 -9.77 -9.18 
      Out-Of-Pocket Price (STD) 9.15 0.15 0.00 8.86 9.44 
Entry Film 
      EntryFilm X Brand Suboxone Tablet FE -1.41 0.07 0.00 -1.55 -1.28 
      EntryFilm X Naltrexone FE -0.68 0.06 0.00 -0.80 -0.55 
      EntryFilm X Other Buprenorphine FE -0.70 0.14 0.00 -0.97 -0.43 
Entry Generic 
      EntryGeneric X Suboxone Film FE -0.45 0.19 0.02 -0.83 -0.07 
      EntryGeneric X Brand Suboxone Tablet FE -2.89 0.23 0.00 -3.34 -2.44 
      EntryGeneric X Other Buprenorphine FE -0.40 0.21 0.05 -0.80 0.00 
      EntryGeneric X Naltrexone FE -0.59 0.19 0.00 -0.97 -0.21 
Product Fixed Effects 
      Suboxone Film FE -1.33 0.13 0.00 -1.58 -1.08 
      Brand Suboxone Tablet FE 0.79 0.13 0.00 0.54 1.04 
      Generic Suboxone Tablet FE -4.00 0.23 0.00 -4.46 -3.54 
      Other Buprenorphine FE -2.93 0.17 0.00 -3.26 -2.59 
      Naltrexone FE -2.25 0.13 0.00 -2.50 -2.01 
Patient Characteristics 
      Comorbid Mental Health Condition -0.25 0.06 0.00 -0.36 -0.13 
      Age -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
      Black -0.41 0.05 0.00 -0.51 -0.31 
      Hispanic 0.01 0.07 0.89 -0.12 0.14 
      Other Race/Ethnicity -0.13 0.11 0.22 -0.34 0.08 
      Disabled -0.06 0.05 0.23 -0.16 0.04 
      Dual Eligible 1.09 0.04 0.00 1.02 1.17 
      Female -0.01 0.03 0.76 -0.07 0.05 
Previous Choice Interactions 
      Last Choice Suboxone Film X Suboxone Film FE 3.49 0.05 0.00 3.39 3.59 
      Last Choice Suboxone Film X Brand Suboxone Tablet FE 0.95 0.09 0.00 0.77 1.12 
      Last Choice Suboxone Film X Generic Suboxone Tablet FE 1.40 0.12 0.00 1.16 1.63 
      Last Choice Suboxone Film X Naltrexone FE -1.73 0.24 0.00 -2.19 -1.26 
      Last Choice Suboxone Film X Other Buprenorphine FE 0.49 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.76 
      Last Choice Brand Suboxone Tablet X Suboxone Film FE 1.28 0.08 0.00 1.13 1.44 
      Last Choice Brand Suboxone Tablet X Brand Suboxone Tablet 
FE 3.32 0.05 0.00 3.21 3.43 
      Last Choice Brand Suboxone Tablet  X Generic Suboxone 
Tablet FE 4.53 0.36 0.00 3.82 5.23 
      Last Choice Brand Suboxone Tablet  X Naltrexone FE -1.90 0.34 0.00 -2.56 -1.23 
38 
 
      Last Choice Brand Suboxone Tablet  X Other Buprenorphine FE 1.12 0.15 0.00 0.82 1.42 
      Last Choice Generic Suboxone Tablet X Suboxone Film FE 1.10 0.15 0.00 0.81 1.39 
      Last Choice Generic Suboxone Tablet X Brand Suboxone Tablet 
FE 0.68 0.73 0.35 -0.76 2.12 
      Last Choice Generic Suboxone Tablet X Generic Suboxone 
Tablet FE 5.67 0.13 0.00 5.42 5.92 
      Last Choice Generic Suboxone Tablet X Naltrexone FE -2.01 0.72 0.01 -3.41 -0.60 
      Last Choice Generic Suboxone Tablet  X Other Buprenorphine 
FE 1.54 0.22 0.00 1.11 1.97 
      Last Choice Other Buprenorphine X Suboxone Film FE 0.47 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.80 
      Last Choice Other Buprenorphine X Brand Suboxone Tablet FE -0.17 0.20 0.39 -0.57 0.23 
      Last Choice Other Buprenorphine X Generic Suboxone Tablet 
FE 2.12 0.22 0.00 1.69 2.56 
      Last Choice Other Buprenorphine X Naltrexone FE -2.85 1.00 0.00 -4.82 -0.89 
      Last Choice Other Buprenorphine  X Other Buprenorphine FE 5.70 0.09 0.00 5.51 5.88 
      Last Choice Naltrexone X Suboxone Film FE -3.13 0.27 0.00 -3.66 -2.59 
      Last Choice Naltrexone X Brand Suboxone Tablet FE -4.09 0.34 0.00 -4.76 -3.42 
      Last Choice Naltrexone X Generic Suboxone Tablet FE -3.05 1.00 0.00 -5.02 -1.09 
      Last Choice Naltrexone X Naltrexone FE 3.76 0.04 0.00 3.69 3.84 
      Last Choice Naltrexone  X Other Buprenorphine FE -2.89 0.60 0.00 -4.08 -1.71 
Year 
      _2011 0.28 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.38 
      _2012 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.52 
      _2013 1.51 0.19 0.00 1.14 1.88 
      _2014 1.77 0.20 0.00 1.37 2.17 
      _2015 1.64 0.20 0.00 1.24 2.03 
      _2016 1.92 0.20 0.00 1.53 2.31 
      _2017 2.37 0.20 0.00 1.98 2.76 





















Appendix Table 1.6A. Parameter Estimates from Discrete-Time Survival Model with 
Competing Risks (Outcome = Adverse Opioid Events)  






      Brand Suboxone Tablet -1.24 0.09 0.00 -1.42 -1.05 
      Generic Suboxone Tablet -1.23 0.12 0.00 -1.46 -0.99 
      Brand Suboxone Film -0.96 0.05 0.00 -1.05 -0.87 
      Other Buprenorphine -1.02 0.12 0.00 -1.25 -0.79 
      Other Naltrexone -1.96 0.12 0.00 -2.18 -1.73 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Disabled 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.22 0.35 
Dual Eligible 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.13 
Comorbid Mental Health or Substance Use 
Disorder 3.26 0.23 0.00 2.81 3.71 
Ancillary Mental Health or Substance Use 
Disorder Treatment 2.39 0.02 0.00 2.35 2.43 
Race/Ethnicity 
      Black 0.02 0.03 0.47 -0.03 0.07 
      Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.38 -0.05 0.14 
      Other Race -0.03 0.05 0.55 -0.13 0.07 
Year 
      2011 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.23 
      2012 0.03 0.05 0.58 -0.07 0.13 
      2013 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.28 
      2014 0.06 0.05 0.28 -0.05 0.17 
      2015 -0.12 0.05 0.01 -0.21 -0.03 
      2016 -0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.16 0.02 
      2017 -0.16 0.05 0.00 -0.25 -0.07 
Months at Risk 
1 -0.63 0.05 0.00 -0.73 -0.53 
2 -0.70 0.05 0.00 -0.80 -0.59 
3 -0.75 0.05 0.00 -0.85 -0.64 
4 -0.77 0.05 0.00 -0.87 -0.66 
5 -0.70 0.05 0.00 -0.80 -0.59 
6 -0.83 0.06 0.00 -0.94 -0.71 
40 
 
7 -0.86 0.06 0.00 -0.98 -0.75 
8 -0.84 0.06 0.00 -0.96 -0.73 
9 -0.94 0.06 0.00 -1.06 -0.82 
10 -0.82 0.06 0.00 -0.94 -0.70 
11 -0.94 0.06 0.00 -1.07 -0.82 
12 -0.82 0.06 0.00 -0.94 -0.70 
13 -0.89 0.06 0.00 -1.02 -0.76 
14 -0.79 0.06 0.00 -0.91 -0.66 
15 -0.82 0.06 0.00 -0.95 -0.69 
16 -0.95 0.07 0.00 -1.08 -0.81 
17 -0.94 0.07 0.00 -1.08 -0.80 
18 -0.99 0.07 0.00 -1.14 -0.85 
19 -0.94 0.07 0.00 -1.08 -0.79 
20 -0.94 0.07 0.00 -1.08 -0.79 
21 -0.99 0.08 0.00 -1.14 -0.83 
22 -0.95 0.08 0.00 -1.11 -0.80 
23 -0.96 0.08 0.00 -1.12 -0.81 
24 -1.20 0.09 0.00 -1.37 -1.02 
25 -1.08 0.09 0.00 -1.25 -0.91 
26 -1.01 0.09 0.00 -1.18 -0.84 
27 -1.14 0.09 0.00 -1.32 -0.96 
28 -1.06 0.09 0.00 -1.24 -0.88 
29 -1.04 0.09 0.00 -1.22 -0.86 
30 -1.01 0.09 0.00 -1.19 -0.83 
31 -1.13 0.10 0.00 -1.32 -0.94 
32 -0.95 0.09 0.00 -1.13 -0.77 
33 -1.04 0.10 0.00 -1.24 -0.85 
34 -1.16 0.11 0.00 -1.37 -0.95 
35 -1.08 0.11 0.00 -1.29 -0.87 
36 -0.95 0.10 0.00 -1.14 -0.75 
37 -1.00 0.10 0.00 -1.20 -0.79 
38 -1.12 0.11 0.00 -1.34 -0.90 
39 -1.00 0.11 0.00 -1.21 -0.80 
40 -1.08 0.11 0.00 -1.30 -0.87 
41 
 
41 -1.06 0.11 0.00 -1.28 -0.85 
42 -1.14 0.12 0.00 -1.37 -0.91 
43 -1.19 0.12 0.00 -1.42 -0.96 
44 -1.10 0.12 0.00 -1.33 -0.87 
45 -0.79 0.10 0.00 -0.99 -0.59 
46 -0.94 0.11 0.00 -1.16 -0.73 
47 -0.88 0.11 0.00 -1.09 -0.67 
48 -0.83 0.11 0.00 -1.04 -0.62 
49 -1.00 0.12 0.00 -1.22 -0.77 
50 -0.99 0.12 0.00 -1.22 -0.76 
51 -1.15 0.13 0.00 -1.40 -0.91 
52 -0.95 0.11 0.00 -1.18 -0.73 
53 -0.89 0.11 0.00 -1.11 -0.67 
54 -1.04 0.12 0.00 -1.27 -0.80 
55 -0.93 0.12 0.00 -1.16 -0.71 
56 -0.95 0.12 0.00 -1.18 -0.72 
57 -0.90 0.12 0.00 -1.12 -0.67 
58 -0.67 0.10 0.00 -0.88 -0.46 
59 -0.74 0.11 0.00 -0.95 -0.53 
60 -1.03 0.12 0.00 -1.27 -0.78 
61 -0.90 0.12 0.00 -1.13 -0.67 
62 -0.87 0.12 0.00 -1.10 -0.64 
63 -0.60 0.10 0.00 -0.80 -0.39 
64 -0.59 0.11 0.00 -0.79 -0.38 
65 -0.76 0.11 0.00 -0.98 -0.53 
66 -0.58 0.11 0.00 -0.79 -0.38 
67 -0.91 0.13 0.00 -1.16 -0.67 
68 -0.90 0.13 0.00 -1.14 -0.65 
69 -0.72 0.12 0.00 -0.95 -0.49 
70 -0.81 0.12 0.00 -1.05 -0.57 
71 -0.79 0.12 0.00 -1.03 -0.55 
72 -0.75 0.12 0.00 -1.00 -0.51 
73 -0.75 0.12 0.00 -1.00 -0.51 
74 -0.67 0.12 0.00 -0.91 -0.42 
42 
 
75 -0.65 0.12 0.00 -0.89 -0.41 
76 -0.57 0.12 0.00 -0.81 -0.33 
77 -0.67 0.13 0.00 -0.92 -0.41 
78 -0.79 0.14 0.00 -1.07 -0.51 
79 -0.49 0.13 0.00 -0.74 -0.24 
80 -0.80 0.15 0.00 -1.10 -0.51 
81 -0.94 0.17 0.00 -1.26 -0.61 
82 -0.67 0.15 0.00 -0.97 -0.38 
83 -0.99 0.18 0.00 -1.35 -0.63 
84 -0.83 0.18 0.00 -1.17 -0.48 
85 -0.71 0.17 0.00 -1.04 -0.37 
86 -0.92 0.20 0.00 -1.30 -0.53 
87 -1.01 0.21 0.00 -1.42 -0.59 
88 -0.64 0.19 0.00 -1.01 -0.28 
89 -0.58 0.19 0.00 -0.96 -0.21 
90 -1.13 0.26 0.00 -1.64 -0.62 
91 -0.86 0.25 0.00 -1.34 -0.38 
92 -0.90 0.27 0.00 -1.43 -0.37 
93 -1.39 0.38 0.00 -2.14 -0.65 
94 -1.62 0.50 0.00 -2.60 -0.63 
95 -0.13 1.02 0.90 -2.13 1.87 
96 -14.62 0.52 0.00 -15.63 -13.61 
97 -14.67 0.71 0.00 -16.06 -13.27 
98 -14.67 0.71 0.00 -16.06 -13.27 
99 -14.67 0.71 0.00 -16.06 -13.27 
100 -14.68 1.00 0.00 -16.64 -12.71 
101 -14.68 1.00 0.00 -16.64 -12.71 
102 -14.68 1.00 0.00 -16.64 -12.71 
103 -17.06 1.00 0.00 -19.03 -15.10 
104 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
105 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
106 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
107 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
108 -17.21 1.00 0.00 -19.17 -15.25 
43 
 
109 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
110 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
111 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
112 -17.21 1.00 0.00 -19.17 -15.25 
113 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
114 -17.21 1.00 0.00 -19.17 -15.25 
115 -14.82 1.00 0.00 -16.79 -12.86 
116 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
117 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
118 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
119 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
120 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
121 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
122 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
123 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
124 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
125 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
126 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
127 -14.72 1.00 0.00 -16.68 -12.75 
Constant -10.08 0.24 0.00 -10.56 -9.61 

















Appendix Table 1.6B. Parameter Estimates from the Discrete-Time Survival Model with 
Competing Risks (Outcome = All-Cause Mortality) 
 






      Brand Suboxone Tablet -1.19 0.32 0.00 -1.82 -0.56 
      Generic Suboxone Tablet -0.76 0.29 0.01 -1.32 -0.19 
      Brand Suboxone Film -1.03 0.16 0.00 -1.34 -0.72 
      Other Buprenorphine -0.48 0.24 0.05 -0.96 -0.01 
      Other Naltrexone -1.16 0.23 0.00 -1.61 -0.70 
Age 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 
Disabled -0.04 0.05 0.35 -0.14 0.05 
Dual Eligible 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.38 
Comorbid Mental Health or Substance Use Disorder 1.76 0.10 0.00 1.57 1.96 
Ancillary Mental Health or Substance Use Disorder 
Treatment -0.61 0.05 0.00 -0.71 -0.52 
Race/Ethnicity 
      Black -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.21 0.00 
      Hispanic -0.18 0.13 0.16 -0.42 0.07 
      Other Race -0.03 0.10 0.78 -0.22 0.17 
Year 
      2011 -0.05 0.11 0.65 -0.28 0.17 
      2012 -0.47 0.12 0.00 -0.71 -0.24 
      2013 -0.37 0.12 0.00 -0.60 -0.13 
      2014 -0.30 0.12 0.02 -0.53 -0.06 
      2015 0.01 0.11 0.93 -0.20 0.22 
      2016 -0.05 0.10 0.65 -0.25 0.15 
2017 -0.11 0.10 0.29 -0.31 0.09 
Months at Risk 
1 -0.44 0.09 0.00 -0.60 -0.27 
2 -0.72 0.09 0.00 -0.91 -0.54 
3 -0.76 0.10 0.00 -0.96 -0.57 
4 -1.03 0.11 0.00 -1.24 -0.81 
5 -0.93 0.11 0.00 -1.14 -0.72 
6 -0.96 0.11 0.00 -1.17 -0.74 
7 -0.86 0.11 0.00 -1.07 -0.65 
8 -0.88 0.11 0.00 -1.09 -0.66 
9 -0.83 0.11 0.00 -1.05 -0.62 
10 -0.80 0.11 0.00 -1.02 -0.58 
11 -1.12 0.13 0.00 -1.38 -0.86 
45 
 
12 -0.95 0.12 0.00 -1.19 -0.71 
13 -0.94 0.13 0.00 -1.18 -0.69 
14 -1.06 0.13 0.00 -1.32 -0.79 
15 -1.06 0.14 0.00 -1.33 -0.79 
16 -0.94 0.13 0.00 -1.20 -0.68 
17 -1.03 0.14 0.00 -1.31 -0.76 
18 -0.78 0.13 0.00 -1.03 -0.53 
19 -0.87 0.14 0.00 -1.14 -0.60 
20 -0.82 0.14 0.00 -1.08 -0.55 
21 -0.71 0.14 0.00 -0.98 -0.45 
22 -0.40 0.12 0.00 -0.64 -0.15 
23 -1.22 0.18 0.00 -1.56 -0.87 
24 -1.13 0.18 0.00 -1.48 -0.79 
25 -1.00 0.17 0.00 -1.33 -0.67 
26 -1.25 0.20 0.00 -1.64 -0.87 
27 -1.09 0.18 0.00 -1.45 -0.72 
28 -1.08 0.19 0.00 -1.44 -0.71 
29 -0.86 0.17 0.00 -1.20 -0.52 
30 -0.90 0.18 0.00 -1.25 -0.55 
31 -0.72 0.17 0.00 -1.05 -0.39 
32 -0.74 0.18 0.00 -1.09 -0.40 
33 -0.58 0.17 0.00 -0.91 -0.25 
34 -0.43 0.16 0.01 -0.75 -0.10 
35 -0.97 0.21 0.00 -1.39 -0.55 
36 -0.88 0.21 0.00 -1.28 -0.47 
37 -1.49 0.27 0.00 -2.02 -0.95 
38 -0.82 0.20 0.00 -1.22 -0.43 
39 -1.17 0.24 0.00 -1.63 -0.70 
40 -0.93 0.21 0.00 -1.35 -0.51 
41 -0.96 0.22 0.00 -1.39 -0.54 
42 -1.00 0.22 0.00 -1.43 -0.57 
43 -1.14 0.24 0.00 -1.60 -0.68 
44 -1.04 0.23 0.00 -1.48 -0.59 
45 -1.60 0.30 0.00 -2.17 -1.02 
46 -0.44 0.18 0.01 -0.78 -0.09 
47 -1.43 0.28 0.00 -1.97 -0.89 
48 -1.49 0.28 0.00 -2.05 -0.94 
49 -2.10 0.38 0.00 -2.85 -1.35 
50 -1.96 0.36 0.00 -2.66 -1.25 
51 -1.46 0.28 0.00 -2.02 -0.91 
46 
 
52 -1.02 0.23 0.00 -1.47 -0.57 
53 -1.70 0.32 0.00 -2.33 -1.07 
54 -1.43 0.28 0.00 -1.98 -0.87 
55 -1.27 0.26 0.00 -1.79 -0.75 
56 -0.92 0.23 0.00 -1.37 -0.48 
57 -1.25 0.26 0.00 -1.77 -0.73 
58 -0.90 0.23 0.00 -1.34 -0.46 
59 -1.30 0.27 0.00 -1.84 -0.77 
60 -1.04 0.24 0.00 -1.52 -0.56 
61 -1.27 0.27 0.00 -1.81 -0.73 
62 -1.94 0.38 0.00 -2.69 -1.19 
63 -1.37 0.29 0.00 -1.95 -0.80 
64 -1.27 0.28 0.00 -1.82 -0.71 
65 -1.32 0.29 0.00 -1.90 -0.75 
66 -1.30 0.29 0.00 -1.87 -0.72 
67 -1.27 0.29 0.00 -1.85 -0.69 
68 -1.02 0.26 0.00 -1.54 -0.50 
69 -1.30 0.31 0.00 -1.91 -0.70 
70 -0.34 0.20 0.08 -0.73 0.05 
71 -0.92 0.26 0.00 -1.44 -0.40 
72 -1.40 0.34 0.00 -2.06 -0.73 
73 -1.24 0.32 0.00 -1.87 -0.61 
74 -1.31 0.34 0.00 -1.97 -0.64 
75 -0.98 0.29 0.00 -1.55 -0.40 
76 -0.93 0.29 0.00 -1.50 -0.35 
77 -1.16 0.34 0.00 -1.82 -0.49 
78 -0.41 0.24 0.09 -0.88 0.07 
79 -0.84 0.31 0.01 -1.44 -0.24 
80 -0.69 0.29 0.02 -1.27 -0.11 
81 -0.47 0.27 0.09 -1.01 0.07 
82 -0.21 0.25 0.41 -0.70 0.29 
83 -1.35 0.45 0.00 -2.23 -0.46 
84 -15.23 0.06 0.00 -15.36 -15.11 
85 -1.43 0.50 0.01 -2.42 -0.44 
86 -1.12 0.45 0.01 -2.01 -0.24 
87 -1.04 0.45 0.02 -1.92 -0.15 
88 -0.60 0.38 0.12 -1.35 0.15 
89 -0.25 0.34 0.46 -0.92 0.42 
90 -0.52 0.41 0.21 -1.33 0.29 
91 -0.57 0.45 0.21 -1.45 0.32 
47 
 
92 0.07 0.36 0.84 -0.63 0.77 
93 0.55 0.32 0.09 -0.08 1.18 
94 1.55 0.24 0.00 1.08 2.02 
95 1.60 1.01 0.11 -0.37 3.58 
96 -14.92 0.62 0.00 -16.14 -13.69 
97 -14.84 0.93 0.00 -16.67 -13.01 
98 -14.84 0.93 0.00 -16.67 -13.01 
99 -14.84 0.93 0.00 -16.67 -13.01 
100 -15.73 1.00 0.00 -17.70 -13.76 
101 -15.73 1.00 0.00 -17.70 -13.76 
102 -15.73 1.00 0.00 -17.70 -13.76 
103 -15.12 1.01 0.00 -17.09 -13.15 
104 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
105 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
106 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
107 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
108 -15.27 1.01 0.00 -17.24 -13.30 
109 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
110 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
111 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
112 -15.27 1.01 0.00 -17.24 -13.30 
113 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
114 -15.27 1.01 0.00 -17.24 -13.30 
115 -15.88 1.00 0.00 -17.85 -13.91 
116 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
117 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
118 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
119 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
120 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
121 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
122 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
123 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
124 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
125 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
126 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
127 -16.00 1.00 0.00 -17.97 -14.03 
Constant -10.95 0.20 0.00 -11.33 -10.56 





Appendix Table 1.7. Second Medication-Assisted Treatment Product Choices Conditional 













BRAND-SUBOXONE-FILM 81.78% 1.51% 1.84% 13.73% 
BRAND-SUBOXONE-TABLET 6.66% 79.48% 0.72% 10.98% 
GENERIC-SUBOXONE-TABLET 12.21% 0.12% 70.10% 16.50% 





The Effect of Nonadherence to Medication-Assisted Treatment on Patient Expenditures 
and Adverse Opioid Events 
 
ABSTRACT 
Medication-Assisted Treatments (MAT) are pharmaceuticals that effectively reduce the 
risk of an opioid overdose when taken consistently.  However, studies have shown that MAT 
adherence is often low and that nonadherence can raise health care costs while worsening patient 
health.  Still, little is known about the immediate effects of MAT nonadherence and product and 
dosage-level heterogeneity. Therefore, this study estimated the effect of MAT treatment gaps on 
patient health and spending.  Specifically, I study buprenorphine adherence due to its ability to 
be prescribed for use at home, where adherence issues may particularly exacerbate outcomes.  
Buprenorphine was also the most commonly used MAT in Medicare where the study was set.  I 
obtain overall estimates and product and dosage-specific estimates using a cohort of Medicare 
patients with opioid use disorder between 2010-2017.  The study found that total patient 
expenditures were between $63.7-$684.6 lower in months when patients received treatment.  
Further, it was found that patients with buprenorphine treatment gaps were 2.83-7.79 times more 
likely to experience an adverse opioid event in some months than patients receiving continuous 
buprenorphine treatment.  Most importantly, patients receiving high dosages of buprenorphine (4 
MG or greater) were less likely to experience an adverse opioid event in months without 
treatment than patients treated with low dosages of buprenorphine (less than 4 MG). High-
dosage buprenorphine patients also had more modest spending increases in the absence of 
treatment.  Policymakers and providers should consider expanding the use of high-dosage 




 Medication-Assisted Treatments (MAT) are efficacious pharmaceuticals used to treat 
patients with opioid use disorder.  When patients take their prescribed MAT consistently (i.e., 
without gaps between prescriptions or missing days during a prescription), their risk of opioid 
overdose is up to 73% lower than when their use is inconsistent (Kinksy et al., 2019).  However, 
adherence is a common issue with MAT, with one study suggest that only 50% of patients 
adhere closely (Mark et al., 2020).  Improving patient adherence to MATs is of critical 
importance to US public health in light of the devastating effects of the US Opioid Epidemic. 
 Despite the high rates of MAT nonadherence, there is limited research regarding the 
effects of MAT nonadherence on patient health and spending.  While some studies have looked 
at adherent and nonadherent patient cohorts they have not fully explored the immediate clinical 
and financial consequences of treatment gaps.  In theory, treatment gaps should increase patient 
spending and worsen health by increasing the likelihood of patient relapse with opioids due to 
uncontrolled cravings in the absence of treatment. However, quantifying the health and spending 
consequence of inconsistent MAT use remains essential to policymakers.  Further, research 
regarding MAT adherence have primarily focused on individual active ingredients of MATs 
(e.g., buprenorphine, methadone, and naltrexone). Studies have not yet thoroughly examined the 
potential product and dosage heterogeneity within the active ingredient.  Understanding potential 
variation in the effects of nonadherence for each MAT product is vital to providers, especially if 
they are faced with several treatment options.  Finally, no study has looked at MAT adherence in 
Medicare. Medication adherence is a significant problem in Medicare, where high rates of 
mental and physical disability can exacerbate compliance issues (MacLaughlin et al., 2005).   
 This study implemented two separate analyses to estimate the association of 
buprenorphine nonadherence with patient spending and health in Medicare.  The analyses 
focused on buprenorphine due to its common use in Medicare.  Buprenorphine is also the most 
common MAT prescribed for use at home, as opposed to physician clinics, where nonadherence 
may pose a particular problem. To study the relationship between buprenorphine adherence and 
patient health, I conducted a survival analysis to relate gaps in buprenorphine treatment to the 
probability of experiencing an adverse opioid event in a given month.  An adverse opioid event 
represented the presence of a diagnosis for opioid abuse, overdose, or adverse effects from 
opioid use and misuse (i.e., withdrawal).  Second, a patient-level fixed effects regression model 
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estimated the association between a gap in buprenorphine treatment and medical, prescription 
drug, and total spending.  In both the health model and spending model, I conducted subgroup 
analyses to determine product and dosage heterogeneity in the effects of treatment gaps. I find 
that patients receiving high dosages of buprenorphine (i.e., 4-8 MG) had lower costs and risk of 
adverse opioid events in treatment gap months than patients receiving low buprenorphine 
dosages (i.e., 0-4 MG).   
 
BACKGROUND 
 Medication adherence has important implications for both patient health and spending.  
When patients do not adhere to their medications, they risk medical complications from their 
underlying illnesses.  Complications may then require additional treatment, which raises medical 
expenditures.  On the contrary, adhering to treatment with certain medications can be expensive, 
and the adverse side effects of treatment can similarly increase the need for additional care.  
Therefore, the extent to which treatment adherence improves patient health and reduces spending 
is determined by the equilibrium of these opposing effects.   
 Studies on nonadherence in the MAT market have shown severe effects on patient health 
and spending (Kinsky, 2020; Ronquest, 2019; Tkacz, 2016).  Since MATs reduce opioid 
cravings and withdrawal symptoms, adherence is critical to reducing the likelihood of patient 
relapse.  In Kinsky and colleagues (2020), the authors find that 3.6% of the patients who adhered 
to buprenorphine and methadone treatment had a nonfatal overdose relative to 13.2% of 
nonadherent patients.  Both Ronquest and colleagues (2019) and Tkacz and colleagues (2016) 
noted that MAT nonadherence increased hospitalizations and emergency department visits. 
MAT adherence may also reduce unnecessary health care expenditures. Kinsky and 
colleagues (2020) found that nonadherence with methadone was associated with significant 
increases in annual patient costs.  Ronquest and colleagues (2019) found similar results, and in 
particular, showed that nonadherent patients spent up to $10,000 more on medical care than 
adherent patients.  Tkacz and colleagues (2016) also observed significant reductions in outpatient 
and inpatient visits and MAT adherent patients' costs.  They find that this reduction ultimately 
outweighed the more significant spending on prescription medications and outpatient visits 
among adherent patients. 
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Gaps in buprenorphine treatment can occur for many different reasons.  Patients may 
experience adverse side effects of treatment that lead to nonadherence, such as opioid 
withdrawal. High treatment costs, both related to the treatment itself and associated costs like 
transportation and taking time off work to receive treatment, can also reduce compliance. 
Pizzicato et al. (2020) observed that younger and female patients were much more likely to 
adhere to treatment than older and male patients.  The authors further found a strong relationship 
between filling a non-MAT opioid prescription during Buprenorphine treatment and lower odds 
of adherence, supported by Kinsky and colleagues (2020).  Both Pizzicato and colleagues (2020) 
and Coker and colleagues (2018) showed that patients taking film buprenorphine at higher 
dosage were more likely to adhere than patients taking tablet buprenorphine and lower 
buprenorphine doses.  Finally, Samples and colleagues (2019) suggest that insurance type (i.e., 
capitated insurance) and patient demographics are also associated with MAT adherence.   
Despite a general understanding of the importance of adherence to MAT and what factors 
are associated with MAT adherence, more research is needed to explore the immediate 
consequences of MAT nonadherence and product-level heterogeneity.  No study has yet 
compared potential variation in the effect of buprenorphine treatment gaps on patient health and 
spending across unique buprenorphine products or dosages.  Again, this information is critical to 
health care providers who must balance the risks and benefits of buprenorphine treatment 
initiation and treatment intensity.  Further, using Medicare as a setting will help determine if 
there are differences in the levels and effects of adherence in a predominantly elderly, disabled, 
and chronically ill population where treatment with opioids is standard and medication adherence 
is lower than in other care settings (MacLaughlin, 2005).  I hypothesized that heterogeneity 




To determine the effect of MAT gaps on patient health and spending I needed 
longitudinal data that captured all relevant patient diagnoses, spending, and medication use.  This 
information was readily accessible by aggregating the Medicare MedPAR, Carrier, Outpatient, 
and Part D annual claims files, including all inpatient and outpatient service utilization and 
prescription drug use for a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries.  Although I would 
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have preferred data on observed medication use when analyzing the effect of treatment gaps, 
missed prescriptions observable in the claims data may signal nonadherence.   
Study Population 
This study used a subsample of Medicare beneficiaries treated with buprenorphine 
between 2010-2017.  Specifically, I selected beneficiaries from an initial 20% random sample of 
all Medicare beneficiaries during the study period if they met two conditions: 1) a diagnosis for 
opioid dependence (see Appendix Table 1 for list of relevant ICD 9 & ICD 10 diagnosis codes) 
and 2) at least one prescription for buprenorphine. Otherwise, I excluded beneficiaries without 
full 12 months of enrollment in Medicare Part A & B and Medicare Part C beneficiaries to 
prevent potentially unobserved diagnoses and spending from biasing results.  I identified 
beneficiaries using the Medicare Beneficiary Summary Files (MBSF), which provides monthly 
Medicare coverage information for each Medicare beneficiary.  After applying all restrictions, I 
obtained an initial sample of 39,440 beneficiaries receiving buprenorphine.  
Before estimating the cost and health models, I matched patients with treatment gaps 1-1 
to patients without treatment gaps on their probability of having one or more buprenorphine 
treatment gaps. Matching was required to control for potential selection into buprenorphine gaps 
by patients on observables. First, I estimated a logistic regression model of "ever gap" on patient 
demographics (age, race, and sex), index buprenorphine product (i.e., indicators for Suboxone 
Film, Brand Suboxone Tablet, Generic Suboxone Tablet, and Buprenorphine HCL), index 
medication active ingredient dosage (0-4 MG low dosage and 4-8 MG high dosage), disability, 
insurance coverage (i.e., Medicaid dual eligibility), patient distance to the closest MAT provider 
(i.e., distance between patient residence zip code centroid and provider practice zip code 
centroid), and year fixed effects based on the year of buprenorphine initiation. The model 
estimated individual patient probabilities of "ever gap," which I used to match patients that had 
one or more treatment gaps to patients without treatment gaps.  The matching created balance in 
the patient sample on characteristics likely to predict buprenorphine adherence as suggested by 
the existing MAT adherence literature (see Table 1).  I obtained patient demographics, including 
patient age, race, ethnicity, gender, Medicaid dual eligibility status, and disability status, from 
the MBSF.  The index MAT product and dosage were available in the Medicare Part D claims 
datafiles.  The final beneficiary sample after 1-1 propensity score matching included 28,298 




The outcomes used in the analyses were the incidence of an adverse opioid event and 
monthly patient medical spending, drug spending, and total spending (i.e., combined medical and 
drug spending).  An adverse opioid event was indicated in some month for a beneficiary if one of 
the following diagnoses was present on their medical claims: 1) opioid abuse, 2) opioid 
overdose, or 3) adverse opioid effects (see Appendix Table 2 for a list of relevant ICD9 and 
ICD10 diagnosis codes).  As a composite measure, adverse opioid effects capture several critical 
endpoints related to failed MAT. I obtained monthly medical expenditures by aggregating the 
cost information provided on all inpatient, outpatient, and professional claims to the patient-
month level.  Similarly, I calculated patient monthly prescription drug spending by aggregating 
all prescription drug claim gross costs to the monthly level.  Finally, total monthly spending 
represented the sum of monthly prescription drug spending and monthly medical spending by a 
patient. 
Independent Variables 
The key covariates used in the analyses were time-varying buprenorphine treatment gap 
indicators.  In particular, I flagged a patient as having a gap in buprenorphine treatment in a 
month if they received buprenorphine fewer than 50% of the total days.  The days supplied 
information on each prescription helped to identify net treatment days in some month. Excess 
treatment days were added to the following month when applicable to ensure that I did not 
falsely identify treated periods as untreated periods.  I defined months without treatment as "gap 
months" as long as the total number of months before reinitiating buprenorphine treatment was 
three or fewer.  I considered patients that had more than three months without treatment in a row 
as discontinued from treatment.  I identified gap months separately from treatment 
discontinuation months to control for potentially differential effects of gaps relative to 
discontinuation. 
The analyses also incorporated patient comorbidities associated with spending.  In 
particular, they used Major diagnostic categories (MDC) to capture physical and mental health 
comorbidities across 25 unique diagnostic categories (Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2019).  I constructed MDCs using diagnostic-related group (DRG) codes in the 
Medicare inpatient claims data, which individually matched one of the 25 MDCs (see Appendix 




To determine the association of time to first patient adverse opioid event with 
buprenorphine treatment gaps, I estimated a discrete-time survival model with the following 
complementary log-log specification: 
𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = +𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   [1] 
The outcome, 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡, represents the probability that some patient i experienced an adverse opioid 
event in a month 𝑡𝑡 conditional on survival up until that time.  The key independent variable, 
𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡, is an indicator representing whether or not some patient had a gap in their buprenorphine 
treatment in month t.  Next, 𝜏𝑡 are individual month dummy codes for each month following 
patient buprenorphine initiation.  𝜏𝑡 is also commonly known as the baseline hazard function. 
Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
 As a discrete time-to-event model, I used panel data at the patient-month level to 
accommodate time-varying treatment gaps.  A log-log link function was used due to the small 
underlying patient probability of experiencing an adverse opioid event in a given month and to 
directly estimate parameters in terms of hazard ratios. The model used variation in each covariate 
over time, both within-subject and between-subject, to recover covariate parameter estimates.  
The model also had several key timing assumptions.  In particular, the model considered patients 
"at-risk" of an adverse opioid event at the time of their index buprenorphine prescription. They 
were then followed until 1) their first adverse opioid event, 2) mortality, 3) disenrollment from 
Medicare parts A or B (including beneficiaries that switch to Part C), or 4) treatment 
discontinuation.  Again, I considered a patient "discontinued" if they had more than three 
consecutive months without treatment, and I censored their observations after their final month 
of treatment.  Note that using a complementary log-log link function allowed for hazard ratios to 
be estimated directly. 
Next, to determine the effects of buprenorphine treatment gaps on spending in the gap 
month, I specified a patient-level fixed-effects regression model estimated under ordinary least 
squares: 
Costit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−2 +∑ 𝑀𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡𝛾𝑚
25
𝑚=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   [2] 
where 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a binary indicator representing the occurrence of a treatment gap for patient i in 
month t.  The model also included two lag gap indicators, 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−2, to adjust for 
persistent spending effects from previous gaps.  Two lags were ultimately chosen given the lack 
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of statistical significance when three or more lags were specified.  Next, 𝑀𝐷𝐶𝑖𝑡 represents 25 
MDC indicators where the absence of one or more MDCs was used as the reference group. To 
further control for unobserved patient factors related to spending, I added individual patient fixed 
effects, 𝜇𝑖.  Finally, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are year fixed effects used to control unobserved cost variation over 
time, and 𝑖𝑡  is an i.i.d. error term. 
 As with the adverse opioid event model, I used patient-month panel data to estimate the 
cost model.  However, unlike the adverse opioid event model, the cost model did not include any 
censoring after the initial adverse opioid event.  Therefore, patients could have one or more 
adverse opioid events, or none at all, but the model used all of their relevant observations for 
estimation.  Unobserved time-invariant patient cost heterogeneity was then absorbed through the 
patient-level fixed effects.  The use of patient-level fixed effects also made this analysis within-
subject, such that the model identified parameter estimates using repeated observations within 
patients over time. 
 I ran the health model and the cost model once for the entire sample, and then separately 
by subgroup for each buprenorphine product (i.e., Brand Suboxone Tablet, Generic Suboxone 
Tablet, Brand Suboxone Film, and Buprenorphine HCL) and dosage type (i.e., low, medium, and 
high).  The subgroups were determined using each patient's index product and dosage, which 
may or may not have changed after that.  Therefore, estimates should be interpreted as 
conditional on initiating a particular drug instead of consuming it in the month where a gap in 
treatment may have occurred.  However, since most gaps in treatment occur shortly after 
initiation (see Appendix Figure 1), the index choice is likely to be highly predictive of the 
subsequent treatment decisions.  Further, switching between MAT products was uncommon. 
 
RESULTS 
 Balance on covariates related to treatment adherence was achieved (See Table 1 for 
matching results).  Before matching, I found notable differences in buprenorphine product 
choice, initial buprenorphine dosage, distance to the nearest MAT provider, disability, and 
Medicaid dual eligibility.  These differences disappeared after matching, with nearly all 
nonadherent patients finding a suitable match.   
 Treatment gaps were primarily observed shortly after treatment initiation (see Appendix 
Figure 1), with an average monthly rate of 0.4 gaps per beneficiary (see Appendix Figure 2).  
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This result may explain why most adverse opioid events occurred shortly after treatment 
initiation (see Appendix Figure 3).  Average total monthly spending was also noticeably higher 
in months when patients experienced treatment gaps (see Appendix Figure 4). 
In months with buprenorphine treatment gaps, patients were 3.47 times more likely on 
average to experience an adverse opioid event than patients without a treatment gap (HR, 3.47 
[95% CI 2.84, 4.25], see Table 2 and Figure 1).  The  results provide evidence of heterogeneity 
in the effect of treatment gaps on health and spending by both product and dosage.  In particular, 
generic Suboxone tablet patients were the most likely to have an adverse opioid event following 
a treatment gap (HR, 7.79 [95% CI 1.88, 32.23] followed by brand Suboxone tablet (HR, 4.36 
[95% CI 3.23, 5.89]), and Brand Suboxone film (HR, 2.83, [95% CI 2.07, 3.87]).  The 
association of treatment gaps with adverse opioid events after initiation with Buprenorphine 
HCL was positive but not statistically significant (HR, 1.32 [95% CI 0.68, 2.56]).  Further, 
patients experiencing buprenorphine treatment gaps after initiating treatment on higher dosages 
of buprenorphine were less likely to experience an adverse opioid event than patients treated 
with lower dosages (High Dosage: HR, 3.41 [95% CI 2.77, 4.19] versus Low Dosage: HR, 5.40 
[95% CI 2.19, 13.32]). 
 Buprenorphine treatment gaps were also associated with an overall increase in patient 
spending (Total Spending: $246.1 [95% CI $197.6, $294.6]).  This reflects a roughly 15% 
increase in baseline total spending per month, given that average total spending by month by 
patient was $1,736 during the study period. The results show that the increase in total spending 
was primarily driven by a large increase in medical spending (Medical Spending: $504.4 [95% 
CI $463.2, $545.5]), which offset a more moderate decrease in spending on prescription drugs 
(Drug Spending: -$258.2 [95% CI -$284.1, -$232.4]).  This finding was consistent across all 
buprenorphine products, although there was notable product and dosage heterogeneity.  
Specifically, gaps in treatment with generic Suboxone tablet led to the largest increases in total 
spending (Total Spending: ($684.6 [95% CI $430.9, $938.2])) followed by Buprenorphine HCL 
(Total Spending: ($334.5 [95% CI $202.3, $466.8])), brand Suboxone tablet (Total Spending: 
($270.3 [95% CI $191.7, $294.6]), and brand Suboxone film (Total Spending: ($153.7 [95% CI 
$81.2, 226.2]).  Further, patients treated with high buprenorphine dosages had smaller overall 
increases in spending in treatment gap months than patients initiated with low dosages (High 
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Dosage Total Spending: $241.18 [95% CI $188.0 $295.6] versus Low Dosage Total Spending: 
$286.3 [95% CI $169.9, $402.7]).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 The study found statistically and empirically significant effects of buprenorphine 
treatment gaps on patient health and spending.  Each treatment gap increased the risk of 
experiencing an adverse opioid event in a given month by between 2.83-7.79 times, depending 
on the particular buprenorphine product selected.  Total expenditures in each treatment gap 
month also increased by between $64-$685 on average, representing a $368-$918 average 
increase in medical spending and a $182-$304 decrease in drug spending.  Further, the results 
showed that patients treated with higher dosages of buprenorphine had lower spending and fewer 
adverse opioid events in treatment gap months than patients receiving lower dosages of 
buprenorphine.  
Interestingly, gaps in treatment with generic Suboxone tablets led to more significant 
increases in spending and adverse opioid events than the other buprenorphine products.  Given 
its bioequivalence with brand Suboxone tablet, this difference is likely due to patients' unique 
characteristics instead of actual biological differences between medications.  For example, those 
taking generic Suboxone tablets may be more price-sensitive and have lower-incomes, which 
could be correlated with worse health outcomes and more frequent treatment gaps.  Variation in 
treatment gap effects across products may further be driven by the frequency of prescriptions 
with specific dosages within the drug.  Providers may be more likely to prescribe higher dosages 
for certain products, like Suboxone film, which could explain its seemingly more optimal safety 
profile among nonadherent patients. 
 The results showed that patients on higher dosages of buprenorphine typically had less 
costly treatment gaps in health and spending.  This result is likely due to increased residual 
buprenorphine in the bloodstream associated with higher dosages that protected patients against 
adverse effects that can lead to relapse and overdose.  Despite this, nearly 20% of providers in 
the sample initiated patients on low buprenorphine dosages (see Table 1).  Given that gaps in 
treatment and attrition frequently happen soon after initiation (see Appendix Figure 1), initiating 
patients on higher dosages could reduce overdoses and health care expenditures.  Further, 
nonadherent patients may have better outcomes if maintained on higher dosages.   
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 It is also important to consider the underlying causes of nonadherence in the context of 
these results.  Patients may experience gaps in treatment due to treatment side-effects, and other 
non-pecuniary factors like access to transportation, child-care services, and the ability to take 
time off from work to receive treatment with MAT at specialized facilities.  Moreover, treatment 
side-effects that lead to treatment gaps are likely centered around a personal desire to experience 
the euphoria associated with opioid use, while the other factors are essentially barriers to access.  
Although the former issue is complicated to solve in patients with strong preferences, the latter 
can and should be addressed by policy reform that connects patients facing these barriers with 
the appropriate services that may reduce them.  In particular, greater coverage of services that 
reduce MAT access related issues may be important for reducing nonadherence that puts patients 
at greater risk of overdose and death. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to this study.  The first limitation is that Medicare did not 
cover methadone during the study period.  Consequently, any patient use of methadone outside 
of Medicare was unobserved.  Unobserved treatment with methadone could potentially increase 
the treatment gap rate in the data for these patients, given that patients predominantly receive one 
MAT product at a time.  However, this should make treatment gap estimates more conservative 
by treating a subset of the control patients (i.e., without an MAT gap) as treated (i.e., having an 
MAT gap).  Another fundamental limitation is that patients may have switched products and 
dosages during the course of their treatment.  Switching can potentially contaminate estimates 
for the dosage and product-level analyses that only consider each patient’s index product and 
dosage.  If there were substantial amounts of product or dosage switching, this would make 
treatment gap estimates across subgroup analyses appear closer together than in reality (i.e., 
underestimate actual variation across products).  Although results for the product level analyses 
were similar to each other, receiving high dosages of buprenorphine was associated with 
empirically and statistically significant reductions in costly adverse opioid events relative to low 
dosages. 
Underlying differences in the patient sample between patients that experience 
buprenorphine treatment gaps and patients without treatment gaps may also bias results.  
Specifically, the extent to which adherence is correlated with product and dosage decisions may 
be confound the treatment gap estimates.  Propensity score matching addressed this variation on 
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several observable characteristics related to MAT treatment adherence in the literature, but 
unobserved factors remain a threat to internal validity.  This bias may, for example, explain the 
higher costs and consequences of gaps in the generic Suboxone tablet cohort.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Buprenorphine nonadherence significantly impacts patient health and spending by 
increasing costly patient adverse opioid events.  Specifically, the study showed a 2.83-7.79 times 
higher risk of experiencing an adverse opioid event in months without treatment and a $63.7-
$684.6 increase in total patient expenditures between 2013-2017.  Some individual 
buprenorphine products stand out, with generic Suboxone tablet increasing expenditures and 
adverse opioid events the most in months with treatment gaps, and brand Suboxone film the 
least.  However, the results demonstrated that patients treated with higher doses of 
buprenorphine were less likely to have high spending and adverse opioid events in months 
without treatment than patients taking lower dosages. Prescribers should consider initiating and 
maintaining nonadherent patients on higher doses of buprenorphine. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
 
Table 2.1. Buprenorphine Treated Beneficiary Characteristics Before and After Propensity 
Score Matching on the Probability of One or More Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps 
 
Covariate 
















Total Beneficiaries 35,965 16,703   11,402 11,402 
Distance to Nearest Buprenorphine 
Prescriber 5.3 4.7   4.8 4.8 
Age (Mean) 51.8 49.3   48.4 48.3 
Medicaid Dual Eligibility           
Dual 66.1% 69.9%   72.4% 72.5% 
Non-Dual 33.9% 30.1%   27.6% 27.5% 
Disability           
Disabled 82.0% 87.1%   91.3% 91.4% 
Non-Disabled 18.0% 12.9%   8.7% 8.6% 
Race/Ethnicity           
White 81.3% 81.7%   82.6% 82.8% 
Black 9.7% 8.9%   8.7% 8.5% 
Other Race 1.8% 1.7%   1.4% 1.4% 
Asian 0.6% 0.7%   0.5% 0.5% 
Hispanic 6.2% 6.5%   6.2% 6.3% 
Native American 0.9% 1.0%   0.9% 0.8% 
Gender           
Female 48.6% 47.5%   47.1% 46.8% 
Male 51.4% 52.5%   52.9% 53.2% 
Index Buprenorphine Prescription 
Product Type           
Brand Suboxone Tablet 19.9% 36.3%   34.9% 35.1% 
Brand Suboxone Film 55.8% 46.5%   47.7% 47.4% 
Generic Suboxone Tablet 9.9% 6.2%   6.1% 6.3% 
Buprenorphine HCL 14.4% 11.0%   11.3% 11.2% 
Index Buprenorphine Prescription 
Dosage Type           
Low Dosage Buprenorphine 16.8% 13.8%   14.4% 14.1% 
High Dosage Buprenorphine 83.2% 86.2%   85.6% 85.9% 






Table 2.2. Effect of Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps on the Adverse Opioid Events by 








Estimates & 95% CI 
All Buprenorphine Products   
3.47*** 
(2.84, 4.25) 
Brand Suboxone Tablet   
4.36*** 
(3.23, 5.89) 
Generic Suboxone Tablet   
7.79** 
(1.88, 32.23) 
Brand Suboxone Film   
2.83*** 
(2.07,3.87) 
Buprenorphine HCL   
1.32 
(0.68, 2.56) 
High Dose (4-8 MG Buprenorphine)   
3.41 *** 
(2.77, 4.19) 
Low Dose (0-4 MG Buprenorphine)   
5.40*** 
(2.19, 13.32) 
Note: Estimates are comparing months in which patients experience buprenorphine gaps to months in which patients do not 





















Table 2.3. Effect of Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps on Monthly Patient Total Spending, 






































































































Figure 2.1. Association between Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps and Adverse Opioid 























Appendix Figure 2.1. Distribution of Months until First Buprenorphine Treatment Gap for 
Medicare Beneficiaries with one or more Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps 
 
 
Note: The bin at 20 reflects 20 or more months until the first treatment gap following treatment initiation. Month 0 (not pictured) 
reflects treatment initiation while month 1 reflects the month following initiation.  The blue line is the normal distribution of the 
data. 
















Appendix Figure 2.2. Total Buprenorphine Treatment Gaps per Beneficiary by Month – 
All Buprenorphine Products 
 
 
Notes: A buprenorphine treatment gap reflects a month for a patient in which 15 consecutive days there was no active 
buprenorphine prescription 

























Appendix Figure 2.3. Total Adverse Opioid Events by Month following Treatment 
Initiation – All Buprenorphine Products 
 
 
Notes: An adverse opioid event reflects the occurrence of opioid overdose, abuse, or adverse effects from overuse.  The X-Axis 
reflects the number of months since treatment initiation, where 0 represents the index prescription for some beneficiary.  Total 
adverse opioid events measure all adverse opioid events in the patient sample in a particular month. 























Appendix Figure 2.4. Total Health Care Expenditures by Month among Patients Treated 
with Buprenorphine – Treatment Gap Months versus Treated Months 
 
 
[Blue: Months with Treatment Gaps | Grey: Months without Treatment Gaps] 
 
Notes: A buprenorphine treatment gap reflects a month for a patient in which 15 consecutive days there was no active 
buprenorphine prescription.  Average Monthly Total Spending reflects the mean of the sum of prescription and medical 
expenditures in the population by calendar month. 
Source: Medicare Part D Prescription Claims Data, Medicare MedPAR Claims Data, Medicare Part B Claims Data, and Medicare 




























ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Dependence  
304: Opioid Dependence-Unspecified 
304.01: Opioid Dependence-Continuous 
304.02: Opioid Dependence-Episodic 
304.03: Opioid Dependence, In Remission 
304.7: Opioid Other Dep-Unspecified 
304.71: Opioid Other Dep-Continuous 
304.72: Opioid Other Dep-Episodic 
304.73: Opioid Other Dep-In Remission 
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and abuse codes) 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
Women in the United States," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical Briefs. Statistical Brief #247. Available 
at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 































ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Abuse  
305.51: Opioid Abuse-Continuous 
305.52: Opioid Abuse-Episodic 
305.53: Opioid Abuse-In Remission 
305.5: Opioid Abuse Unspecified 
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and dependence codes) 
Adverse  
Effects 
E935.2: Other opiates and related 
Narcotics Causing Adverse Effects 
in Therapeutic Use 
T40.0X5: Adverse effect of opium 
T40.2X5: Adverse effect of other opioids 
T40.3X5: Adverse effect of Methadone 
Overdose 
965: Opium Poisoning 
965.09: Poisoning by other opiates 
and related narcotics 
E850.2: Accidental poisoning by 
other opiates and related narcotics 
T40.0X1, 0X2, 0X3, 0X4: Poisoning by 
opium–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.1X1, 1X2, 1X3, 1X4: Poisoning by 
heroin–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.2X1, 2X2, 2X3, 2X4: Poisoning by other 
opioids–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.3X1, 3X2, 3X3, 3X4: Poisoning by 
Methadone–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
Women in the United States," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical Briefs. Statistical Brief #247. Available 
at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 









Appendix Table 2.3. Mapping of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) to Major 
Diagnostic Categories (MDC)    
MDC Description  
DRG 
Range  
MDC 01 Diseases & Disorders of the Nervous System 20-103 
MDC 02 Diseases & Disorders of the Eye 113-125 
MDC 03 Diseases & Disorders of the Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat 129-159 
MDC 04 Diseases & Disorders of the Respiratory System 163-208 
MDC 05 Diseases & Disorders of the Circulatory System 215-316 
MDC 06 Diseases & Disorders of the Digestive System 326-395 
MDC 07 Diseases & Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System & Pancreas 405-446 
MDC 08 Diseases & Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System & Connective 
Tissue 453-566 
MDC 09 Diseases & Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue & Breast 573-607 
MDC 10 Endocrine, Nutritional & Metabolic Diseases & Disorders 614-645 
MDC 11 Diseases & Disorders of the Kidney & Urinary Tract 652-700 
MDC 12 Diseases & Disorders of the Male Reproductive System 707-730 
MDC 13 Diseases & Disorders of the Female Reproductive System 734-761 
MDC 14 Pregnancy, Childbirth & the Puerperium 765-782 
MDC 15 Newborns & Other Neonates with Conditions Originating in Perinatal 
Period 789-795 
MDC 16 Diseases & Disorders of Blood, Blood Forming Organs, Immunologic 
Disorders 799-816 
MDC 17 Myeloproliferative Diseases & Disorders, Poorly Differentiated 
Neoplasms 820-849 
MDC 18 Infectious & Parasitic Diseases, Systemic or Unspecified Sites 853-872 
MDC 19 Mental Diseases & Disorders 876-887 
MDC 20 Alcohol/Drug Use & Alcohol/Drug Induced Organic Mental Disorders 894-897 
MDC 21 Injuries, Poisonings & Toxic Effects of Drugs 901-923 
MDC 22 Burns 927-935 
MDC 23 Factors Influencing Health Status & Other Contacts with Health 
Services 939-951 
MDC 24 Multiple Significant Trauma 955-965 
MDC 25 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections 969-977 
    




CHAPTER III:  
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access, Utilization, and Health Outcomes in the 
Medication Assisted Treatment Market for Opioid Use Disorder 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Medication-Assisted Treatments (MATs) are efficacious pharmaceuticals for treating 
opioid use disorder. However, recent studies have shown racial and ethnic disparities in MAT 
that threaten to drive the opioid epidemic's severity in underserved communities.  This study 
analyzed disparities in MAT access, use, and treatment outcomes in a population of Medicare 
beneficiaries with opioid use disorder.  The study found significant disparities in access and 
treatment use, but only minor variation in treatment outcomes conditional on receiving treatment.  
Therefore, expanding treatment access and use will be vital to reducing racial and ethnic 
disparities in opioid overdose and abuse.  Further, provider behavior was strongly associated 
with disparities in treatment use.  Policymakers should consider addressing these disparities in 








Medication-Assisted Treatments (MAT) are pharmaceuticals used to curb patient 
addiction to opioids and prevent opioid withdrawal. Due to their efficacy, policymakers and 
providers have acted swiftly to increase their use in communities significantly affected by the US 
Opioid Epidemic. However, there remain substantial disparities in MAT access, use, and opioid 
related outcomes even though addiction rates are comparable by race and ethnicity (Alexander, 
Kiang, and Barbieri, 2018).  Given the efficacy of MAT in reducing opioid overdose and related 
mortality, addressing racial and ethnic disparities in MAT delivery, access, and outcomes is 
critical.  Formal policy responses are especially urgent given that recent studies have shown 
notable increases in non-white opioid-related overdose deaths over the last five years (Drake, 
Charles, Bourgeois, Daniel, and Kwende 2020).  This trend has exacerbated since the start of the 
COVID-19 pandemic (Ghatri, Pizzicato, Viner, et al. 2020).   
While many studies have identified racial and ethnic disparities in MAT, the underlying 
mechanisms that drive these disparities are understudied.  Disparities can theoretically result 
from medical practitioners' inequitable treatment, social and community-level factors, provider 
accessibility, and patient preferences. However, the extent to which each plays a role in driving 
inequity is unknown.  A better understanding of the root causes of disparities in MAT is needed 
to produce rigorously informed public health policy responses to improve addiction treatment 
equity. 
 I performed three separate analyses to estimate the magnitude of provider behavior and 
social vulnerability on driving MAT disparities in treatment access, use, and outcomes.  The first 
analysis identified disparities in access by estimating the probability that patients encountered a 
MAT provider.  The second analysis then examined disparities in receiving MAT conditional on 
having an encounter with a prescribing physician.  Finally, I quantified disparities in adverse 
opioid events (e.g., overdose, abuse, and adverse effects of opioids) conditional on receiving 
MAT treatment.  For each analysis, I estimated a base model relating race and ethnicity to the 
relevant outcome initially. I then modeled additional specifications that added covariates related 
to each root cause of MAT disparities.  The study then compared marginal effects between the 
base model and the expanded specifications to determine the role of provider and social factors 
in driving disparities.  In most cases, if the parameters for racial and ethnic groups decreased or 
became insignificant in the layered models, I attributed either provider or social factors to the 
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underlying disparity. The results ultimately show that provider factors are essential modifiers of 
MAT use, which likely explains the higher rates of adverse opioid events in racially and 
ethnically diverse patients.   
 
BACKGROUND 
 The literature on racial and ethnic disparities in MAT has identified severe MAT access, 
use, and subsequent health outcome issues.  The underlying drivers of these disparities have been 
primarily linked to provider factors and social determinants of health.   
Providers treating non-white patients are more likely to under-prescribe and fail to adhere 
to treatment guidelines.  This notion is evidenced in particular by D'Aunno and Pollack (2002), 
who showed that African American heroin users are more likely than white heroin users to 
receive inadequate doses of Methadone. Further, Schiff and colleagues (2020) observed that 
African American and Hispanic pregnant women were much less likely to receive buprenorphine 
than white women. Pregnant women with opioid use disorder are strongly recommended to use 
buprenorphine to prevent relapse with more potent opioids.  MAT prescribers have also been less 
likely to locate near or provide care for patients in non-white neighborhoods. Hansen and 
colleagues (2016) noted that buprenorphine prescribing in New York City increased the most in 
neighborhoods with the lowest proportion of African Americans and Hispanic residents between 
2004 and 2013.  Stein and colleagues (2018) found that in 2009, counties with the highest 
proportions of African American and Hispanic residents had the lowest MAT use rates in 
Medicaid.  Further, Goedel and colleagues (2020) observed that for every 1% decrease in the 
probability of interaction between African American and white residents in a community, the 
number of methadone facilities increased by 0.6 facilities.  Treatment with Methadone occurs 
only in highly regulated systems, creating additional time and access burdens for patients. 
 Social determinants also play an essential role in driving MAT disparities.  There are 
substantial disparities in access to affordable transportation, child care, and the ability to take 
time off from work to receive treatment that limits MAT accessibility in underserved areas.  
These burdens are exacerbated by the fact that non-white patients are far more likely to receive 
Methadone, which requires patients to take daily trips to clinics.  The additional burdens faced 
by non-white patients then reduce treatment adherence and increase the rate of early MAT 
discontinuation.  For example, Samples and colleagues (2018) find that African American and 
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Hispanic patients are 1.24-1.31 times more likely than white patients to discontinue MAT within 
180 days after initiation.  Most patients also either use self-pay and private insurance for 
buprenorphine treatment, which Lagisetty and colleagues (2019) identified. This result suggests 
disparities in insurance coverage type and generosity and income drive MAT disparities.   
 The purpose of this study was to quantify the role of providers and social determinants in 
driving disparities in MAT access, use, and health outcomes.  Specifically, the focus was to 
estimate the effects of race and ethnicity on the probability of seeing a prescribing physician, 
obtaining treatment conditional on a visit, and having good health outcomes conditional on 
treatment while controlling for provider-level factors and social vulnerability.  These additional 
controls will make it possible to study the impact of ecological circumstances and provider 
behavior on existing disparities identified in the models without their inclusion.  More generally, 
addressing the knowledge gap concerning the underlying causes of MAT disparities is essential 
to policymakers and providers seeking to make MAT more equitable.    
 
METHODS 
Study Population  
The study used a population of Medicare beneficiaries diagnosed with opioid use disorder 
between 2013-2017 to determine the association of provider behavior and social determinants 
with MAT disparities in access, use, and treatment outcomes.  Many Medicare beneficiaries 
suffer from opioid use disorder due to chronic illnesses that require treatment with opioids that 
can lead to addiction.  In response, coverage of MAT has been increasing in Medicare, and more 
providers have started prescribing MAT to their Medicare patients.  However, there is limited 
research concerning potential variation in these services' diffusion by race and ethnicity.  Given 
the growing evidence of disparities in other health care programs like Medicaid, it is vital to 
determine the extent to which MAT disparities exist in one of the nation's most vulnerable 
populations. 
Starting with an initial sample of 10,241,222 Fee-for-Service Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled for at least one year between 2013-2017, I obtained a cohort of 325,520 beneficiaries 
who had at least one diagnosis for opioid use disorder during the entire study period (see 
Appendix Table 1 for list of included ICD9 and ICD10 diagnoses codes).  Their relevant medical 
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and prescription drug claims were then extracted from the Medicare Carrier, MedPAR, and Part 
D claims data.   
Dependent Variables  
The study focused on three different outcomes.  First, to proxy beneficiary access to 
treatment, I used the presence of a patient encounter with an MAT prescriber.  I identified visits 
using Medicare Part B carrier claims data, which contain all claims billed by Medicare 
physicians (i.e., professional claims).  I considered any visit with a MAT prescriber an encounter 
even if the actual reason for the visit was unrelated to the patient's opioid use disorder.  A 
provider also had to have one or more MAT prescriptions in the year of the encounter to qualify 
as an MAT prescriber.  I identified MAT prescribers using the Medicare Part D claims data 
which indicated the prescriber national provider identifier (NPI) on each prescription.   
The subsequent outcome, MAT use, reflected whether a patient received one or more 
MAT prescriptions conditional on an initial encounter with a prescribing physician.  Any 
prescription MAT fill qualified a patient as receiving MAT treatment regardless of MAT product 
type or if the initial encounter physician was the index prescriber.   
The last outcome was the presence of an adverse opioid event conditional on treatment.  
An adverse opioid event reflects the occurrence of one or more of the following in some months: 
opioid abuse, overdose, or adverse effects (i.e., opioid withdrawal).  I developed this measure 
using a set of ICD9 and ICD10 diagnosis codes identified in the Medicare medical claims data 
(see Appendix Table 2 for list of ICD codes).  
Independent Variables  
The first set of covariates used in the statistical models included a combination of 
beneficiary demographics and county-level social determinants of health (SDOH).  I obtained 
beneficiary characteristics from the Medicare Beneficiary Summary Files (MBSF). They 
included age, race (i.e., African American, Asian, Native American, or Other/Unknown Race), 
ethnicity (i.e., Hispanic), gender, Medicaid dual eligibility status, and disability.  I used county-
level SDOH variables from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Social 
Determinants of Health (SDOH) Database files (2013-2017).  The AHRQ SDOH files contain 
measures corresponding to five key SDOH domains: 1) social context, 2) economic context, 3) 
education, 4) physical infrastructure, and 5) healthcare.  In addition to individual factors, AHRQ 
provides specialized social vulnerability indexes by 1) socioeconomics, 2) household 
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composition and disability, 3) minority status/language, 4) housing/transportation, and 5) overall 
social vulnerability. These indexes reflect each county's percentile rank concerning a weighted 
average of the individual measures in each group.  Note that the analyses only used the 
socioeconomic, household composition, and housing/transportation domains.  I excluded the 
minority/language and overall index due to their correlation with beneficiary race.  
I also incorporated several provider-level factors into the analyses. The first provider 
measure reflected the distance between a beneficiary's residence and the nearest MAT prescriber.  
I constructed this measure by calculating the distance between the beneficiary residence zip code 
and the closest MAT provider's practice zip code using the haversine formula (i.e., distance as 
the crow flies).  Each beneficiary's zip code was reported annually in the MBSF.  However, to 
determine a provider's zip code, each provider had to be assigned to a unique practice.  Provider 
practice assignment was determined using the plurality of each provider's charges at the Tax 
Identification Number (TIN) level, where the resulting TIN assignment identified the provider's 
zip code.  Further, in addition to distance, provider-level fixed effects were used to control for 
time-invariant unobserved provider characteristics potentially associated with treatment 
disparities.   
The final covariate was an indicator representing a patient MAT gap in a given month.  In 
particular, a patient was said to experience a gap in MAT if there were 15 or more days in some 
month where they were not receiving MAT.  The duration of each MAT prescription was 
determined by adding the days supplied on the prescription to the prescription fill date.  The days 
between MAT windows then identified months where patients were not on treatment for the 
plurality of days in that month.   
Models 
I used Logistic regression to relate the probability of encountering a MAT prescriber to 
patient demographics, social determinants, and provider proximity: 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐸𝑖
∗ = 1) 
     = 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑆𝐷𝑂𝐻𝑐(𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜔𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖   [2] 
𝐸𝑖
∗ = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑁𝑜 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑤/ 𝑀𝐴𝑇 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟"
1, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑤/ 𝑀𝐴𝑇 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟"
 
On the left-hand side of the equation, there is 𝐸𝑖, which is a binary indicator set to 1 if a patient i 
ever had a visit with a MAT prescriber.  On the right-hand side, there is 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 , which 
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correspond to indicators for each race and ethnicity among African American, Asian, Hispanic, 
Native American, other/unknown race, and White.  Next, I included patient demographics with 
the exclusion of race and ethnicity in 𝑋𝑖 (i.e., age, gender, Medicaid dual eligibility, and 
disability). County-level social vulnerability index scores from patient i residing in county c were 
captured by 𝑆𝐷𝑂𝐻𝑐(𝑖) (i.e., housing and transportation vulnerability index, socioeconomic 
vulnerability index, and housing composition and disability vulnerability index).  Patient 
distance in miles to the nearest MAT prescriber 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, and year fixed effects, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑖), were 
incorporated to control for provider proximity and encounter variation over time.  Note that the 
year used in the year fixed effects for each beneficiary was the year of the diagnosis for opioid 




 After estimating the MAT encounter model, I estimate a second logistic regression model 
that relates the probability of receiving MAT conditional on an encounter to demographics, 
social determinants, and provider factors: 
𝑇𝑖 = Pr(𝑇𝑖
∗ = 1|𝐸𝑖
∗ = 1) 
     = 𝛽0 + 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑆𝐷𝑂𝐻𝑐(𝑖)𝛾 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑖) + θ𝑖  [3] 
𝑇𝑖
∗ = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑁𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤/ 𝑀𝐴𝑇"
1, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤/ 𝑀𝐴𝑇"
 
The outcome, 𝑇𝑖, reflects the probability that a patient received treatment conditional on an 
encounter with a MAT prescriber.  Note that I reused the independent variables from Equation 1, 
except for distance which I omitted and provider level fixed effects, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖, which I added.  
Further, θ𝑖 is the new error term.   
The addition of provider level fixed effects controlled for fixed unobserved provider 
factors correlated with the decision to initiate a patient on MAT.  The use of provider fixed 
effects also created a within-provider interpretation for the estimates.  This means that the 
estimates reflected actual differences in treatment given to patients of different races and 
ethnicities by the same provider. 
Finally, to evaluate disparities in MAT outcomes, a mixed effect logistic regression 
model was used to estimate the probability of experiencing an adverse opioid event by patient 
race and ethnicity:  
𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟(𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1|𝑇𝑖
∗ = 1) 





0, 𝑖𝑓 "𝑁𝑜 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡"
1, 𝑖𝑓 "𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡"
 
The dependent variable, 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡, is a binary indicator set to 1 in any month t that some beneficiary 
i experienced an adverse opioid event.  Novel covariates include 𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡, which indicated MAT 
gaps and was set to one in each month where a patient received MAT less than 50% of the days 
in that month, and the error term 𝑖𝑐𝑡 =  ~ 𝑁(0, 
𝜋2
3
).  Unlike the previous models, the data used 
to estimate this equation was at the patient month panel level (i.e., one observation per patient 
per month), which permitted the estimation of a discrete time-to-event model.  The data were 
also censored following the first instance of an adverse opioid event, making it a time-to-event 
analysis.  This limited the persistence of previous adverse opioid events from biasing estimates 
for patients experiencing multiple adverse opioid events.  It also changed the interpretation of 
parameter estimates to be relative to experiencing one or more adverse opioid events in a given 
month following treatment initiation.  I additionally censored patients after death or 
disenrollment from Medicare (including a transition to Medicare managed care plans where 
claims will be unobserved). 
 Since the purpose of the study was to understand how different provider and SDOH 
factors modified disparities, I compared a base model using only beneficiary characteristics to 
additional specifications that incorporated SDOH and provider-level covariates.  Specifically, I 
first estimated each of the three models using only demographics 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖 (i.e., 
the “base model”), and then re-estimated the models with the inclusion of SDOH and provider 
covariates (i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 fixed effects, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖).  I then compared differences in parameter 
estimates for race and ethnicity across the base model and the additional specifications to see 
how SDOH and provider factors changed estimates relative to the base model.  Note that before 
comparing estimates across models, I transformed them into marginal effects (ME).  Adding 
covariates to a logistic regression model changes the standard deviation of the error term, which 
Norton and Dowd (2018) show prevent comparisons of odds ratios across different 
specifications.  Marginal effects permit cross-specification comparisons by comparing predicted 







 Descriptive statistics of covariates comparing beneficiaries across each outcome can be 
found in Table 1.  Relative to beneficiaries with no encounters with MAT prescribers, 
beneficiaries with encounters were more likely to be disabled, younger, Medicaid dual eligible, 
and to reside in communities with lower (i.e., worse) social vulnerability index scores.  
Differences by race, ethnicity, and gender were modest, with more diversity in the no encounter 
group.  However, race, ethnicity, and gender differences were substantial across beneficiaries 
with and without treatment and adverse opioid events.  Specifically, non-white beneficiaries 
were less likely to receive treatment conditional on a MAT prescriber encounter and more likely 
to experience an adverse opioid event conditional on treatment.  Further, beneficiaries receiving 
treatment and not experiencing adverse opioid events had lower social vulnerability index scores. 
Results from the MAT prescriber encounter model (i.e., equation [1]) show that white 
beneficiaries were more likely than African American, Asian, Hispanic, and other/unknown race 
beneficiaries to have an encounter with a MAT prescriber (see Table 2).  In the base model 
without social vulnerability and provider factors, the most pronounced effects were seen in Asian 
beneficiaries (ME, -0.106 [95% CI: -0.126, -0.086]), followed by Native American (ME, -0.083 
[95% CI: -0.100, -0.065]), African American (ME, -0.061 [95% CI: -0.067, -0.056]), Hispanic 
(ME, -0.065 [95% CI: -0.073, -0.057]), and other/unknown race beneficiaries (ME, -0.015 [95% 
CI: -0.031, 0.002]).  In the following specifications, parameter estimates for race and ethnicity 
covariates became more negative (i.e., disparities increased), except for Native American 
patients whose estimates increased when adding social vulnerability indexes (ME, -0.077 [95% 
CI: -0.097, -0.056]) and distance to the nearest MAT prescriber (ME, -0.063 [95% CI: -0.084, -
0.042]). 
Estimates from the MAT utilization model also show substantial MAT use disparities by 
race and ethnicity (see Table 3).  As with the encounter model, the base model estimates for race 
and ethnicity were all negative (see Table 3 column 1). In particular, conditional on having a 
MAT prescriber visit, non-white beneficiaries were 2.1%-8.6% percentage points less likely to 
receive MAT than white beneficiaries.  After adding social vulnerability indexes and provider 
fixed effects to the base model, the estimates became more negative.  This is in exception of 
Native American beneficiaries who again had larger estimates after controlling for social and 
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provider factors (Base Model w/ SDOH: ME, -0.033 [95% CI: -0.051, -0.015]; Base Model w/ 
SDOH & Provider Factors: ME, 0.028 [95% CI: -0.010, 0.066]).  
The final set of results show that conditional on MAT, disparities in resulting adverse 
opioid events (i.e., treatment outcomes) were limited.  This result is evidenced by the empirically 
small and statistically insignificant marginal effects for nearly all racial and ethnic groups in the 
base model, the base model with social vulnerability index controls, and the base model with 
social vulnerability index controls and treatment provider-level fixed effects.  The one exception 
was Asian patients, who had positive and statistically significant parameter estimates in the final 
specification (ME, 0.5673 [95% CI: 0.1213, 1.0132]).   
 
DISCUSSION 
Together, the results illustrate the severity of MAT disparities by race and ethnicity. First, 
the MAT access model showed that non-white beneficiaries were much less likely to have any 
encounter with MAT prescribers.  This finding held even after controlling for provider proximity 
and social vulnerability.  Disparities even increased after controlling for distance to the nearest 
MAT provider, suggesting that closer proximity among non-white patients may be masking an 
even more significant disparity in access. The likelihood that non-white beneficiaries then 
received MAT conditional on an encounter was also much lower.  The social vulnerability 
indexes had only minor impacts on treatment use disparities, suggesting that other factors may 
better explain the original disparities.  One likely source is provider bias, given the fact that I 
observed more considerable disparities for African American, Asian, and Hispanic patients after 
incorporating encounter provider fixed effects.  More clearly, conditional on visiting the same 
MAT prescriber, white patients had an increased likelihood of receiving treatment than patients 
in other racial and ethnic groups.   
One interesting finding was that MAT access and use disparities for Native Americans 
decreased in the models with social and provider factors.  This decrease suggests that provider 
proximity, provider practice, and social vulnerability are highly associated with disparities in 
MAT access and use among Native Americans with opioid use disorder, given that they 
explained the original variation in the base model. 
 Once treated, beneficiaries of all races experienced similar treatment outcomes.  This 
result is evidenced by the generally statistically insignificant race and ethnicity parameter 
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estimates in all of the specifications.  Although the estimate for Asian patients became positive 
and significant after incorporating treatment provider fixed-effects, this might be explained by 
the limited number of Asian patients receiving MAT from prescribers treating multiple opioid 
use disorder patients.  Otherwise, Medicaid Dual Eligible status and MAT gaps were the most 
significant predictors of future adverse opioid events. 
All findings stress the need for policy reform. National programs aimed, in particular, at 
educating prescribers about existing MAT access and use disparities while encouraging and 
incentivizing them to expand treatment to vulnerable populations should be considered.  This 
policy is especially pertinent given the finding of increased disparities after controlling for 
encounter provider fixed effects in the treatment use model; clinics seeing multiple patients of 
potentially different races were even less likely to treat African American and Hispanic patients 
than smaller practices with less racial diversity.  The treatment access and use results also 
illustrate that other factors, such as beneficiary preferences, could be significantly related to 
disparities.  Resources allocated to improving culturally competent addiction services might 
increase the rate at which individuals in underserved groups seek and accept MAT.  Qualitative 
research has pointed to differential experiences of BIPOC patients in treatment programs as 
driving hesitancy.  
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the study design that limit generalizability and threaten 
internal validity.  The first is that Medicare did not cover Methadone during the study period.  
Therefore, there may be unobserved use of Methadone use in the beneficiary sample, which may 
inflate estimates of disparities in the MAT use model in particular.  However, given the 
advantages of buprenorphine relative to Methadone, this model still captures key MAT use 
disparities.  The second issue is that the selected social and provider factors may not fully 
capture all relevant confounders in these domains.  If many unobserved factors related to 
provider behavior and patient environments were not addressed, then the disparities estimates 
will be biased.  Regardless, I was able to make meaningful inferences by exploring how 
parameters change after incorporating social vulnerability and provider factors across the 
different models.   
Another potential limitation to the generalizability of this study is that MAT prescribing 
in Medicare is unique, given the high rates of opioid use to treat pain from chronic conditions 
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common among Medicare beneficiaries.  Disparities in other insurance programs may therefore 
manifest differently.  One could imagine, for example, that patients in Medicaid may experience 
even greater disparities in access and use due to their more limited income relative to Medicare 
patients.  Specifically, barriers to access and use such as limited transportation, access to child 
care services, and the ability to take time off from work will therefore be exacerbated in 
Medicaid.  With that said, there is a vast population of Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, and 
under 65 beneficiaries who qualify for Medicare due to End-Stage Renal Disease and Disability, 
in the patient sample who may face somewhat similar MAT access and use barriers.  Still, future 
work should consider alternative insurance programs to ensure the generalizability of my 
findings in Medicare.   
 One final limitation is that it is not clear from this research how reducing MAT access 
and use will ultimately effect disparities in adverse opioid events.  I found that conditional on 
receiving treatment that disparities are minimal, but Table 1 confirms that adverse opioid event 
rates are generally higher in the non-white subgroups.  Understanding the effect of access and 
use disparities on differences in adverse opioid events rates by race and ethnicity remains an 
essential research question, and is left for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The study found substantial disparities in MAT access and use in a population of US 
Medicare beneficiaries between 2013-2017.  In particular, non-white beneficiaries were 
significantly less likely to have encounters with MAT prescribing physicians or to go on to 
receive MAT.  However, after initiating treatment, beneficiaries of different races and ethnicities 
had similar likelihoods of experiencing an adverse opioid event.  Hence, increasing treatment 
access and use could reduce the underlying differences in adverse opioid event rates in the 
general population. In particular, the findings show that policy reform aimed at increasing MAT 
use might consider focusing on carefully addressing MAT prescriber bias.  Further, expanding 
access to culturally competent addiction treatment may increase the rate at which racially and 
ethnically diverse patients seek treatment. Future research should consider the effect of treatment 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
 
















Total Beneficiaries 107,578 155,949 129,824 26,125 22,037 2,102 
Race/Ethnicity             
African American 12.7% 12.6% 13.3% 9.1% 8.2% 10.5% 
Asian 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 
Hispanic 5.9% 5.6% 5.5% 6.1% 6.2% 7.6% 
Native American 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.5% 
Other Race 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 
White 78.0% 79.0% 78.3% 82.0% 83.0% 79.7% 
Gender             
Female 56.9% 56.0% 57.7% 48.0% 48.4% 43.9% 
Male 43.1% 44.0% 42.3% 52.0% 51.6% 56.1% 
Medicaid Dual Eligible 35.5% 53.2% 49.8% 70.0% 71.0% 79.8% 
Disability 52.8% 74.1% 70.6% 91.5% 93.8% 96.0% 
Age (Mean) 67.20 60.36 62.23 51.09 50.71 48.08 
MAT Gap - - - - 54.2% 74.0% 
 
Miles to Nearest MAT 
Prescriber (Mean) 
6.6 4.9 5.0 4.1 - - 
 
Social Determinants of 
Health 
            
Socioeconomic Index 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.42 
Disability Index 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.32 
Transportation Index 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.63 
 
      













Table 3.2.  Marginal Effect Estimates from a Logistic Regression of the Probability of 
Medication-Assisted Treatment Prescriber Encounter on Race/Ethnicity  
  
Covariate Base Model 
Base Model  
w/ SDOH 
Base Model  
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Table 3.3.  Marginal Effect Estimates from a Logistic Regression of Race/Ethnicity on 
the Probability of Medication-Assisted Treatment - Conditional on a Prescriber 
Encounter 
  
Covariate Base Model 
Base Model  
w/ SDOH 
Base Model  
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Provider Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
 





Table 3.4. Marginal Effect Estimates of a Logistic Regression of Race/Ethnicity on the 
Probability of One or More Adverse Opioid Events - Conditional on a Medication-
Assisted Treatment Prescription 
  
Covariate Base Model 
Base Model  
w/ SDOH 
Base Model  






















































































































Provider Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
 
Note: 2013 is the reference group for the year fixed effects. White is the reference group for the race and ethnicity estimates. 
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Figure 3.1. Proportion of Beneficiaries Treated by Race by the Total Number of Treated 




























ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Dependence  
 
304: Opioid Dependence-Unspecified 
304.01: Opioid Dependence-Continuous 
304.02: Opioid Dependence-Episodic 
304.03: Opioid Dependence, In Remission 
304.7: Opioid Other Dep-Unspecified 
304.71: Opioid Other Dep-Continuous 
304.72: Opioid Other Dep-Episodic 
304.73: Opioid Other Dep-In Remission 
  
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and abuse codes) 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
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Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 


























ICD 9 Codes ICD 10 Codes 
Abuse  
305.51: Opioid Abuse-Continuous 
305.52: Opioid Abuse-Episodic 
305.53: Opioid Abuse-In 
Remission 
305.5: Opioid Abuse Unspecified 
F11 series: Opioid-related disorders  
(except F11.21 and dependence codes) 
Adverse  
Effects 
E935.2: Other opiates and related 
Narcotics Causing Adverse Effects 
in Therapeutic Use 
T40.0X5: Adverse effect of opium 
T40.2X5: Adverse effect of other opioids 
T40.3X5: Adverse effect of Methadone 
Overdose 
965: Opium Poisoning 
965.09: Poisoning by other opiates 
and related narcotics 
E850.2: Accidental poisoning by 
other opiates and related narcotics 
T40.0X1, 0X2, 0X3, 0X4: Poisoning by 
opium–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.1X1, 1X2, 1X3, 1X4: Poisoning by 
heroin–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.2X1, 2X2, 2X3, 2X4: Poisoning by other 
opioids–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
T40.3X1, 3X2, 3X3, 3X4: Poisoning by 
Methadone–accidental, intentional self-harm, 
assault, or undetermined 
Sources:  
ICD 9 Codes obtained from Owens, PL, Barret, ML, Weiss, AJ, Washington, RE, and Kronick R, (2014) "Hospital Inpatient 
Utilization Related to Opioid Overuse Among Adults, 1993–2012," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical 
Briefs. Statistical Brief #177. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538344/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
ICD 10 Codes obtained from Weiss, AJ, McDermott, KW, and Heslin, KC, (2016) "Opioid-Related Hospital Stays Among 
Women in the United States," Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Statistical Briefs. Statistical Brief #247. 
Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK246983/ Accessed: October 30, 2020. 
 
Abbreviation:  
ICD-9, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision 


























AFRICAN AMERICAN 45,160 3,148 14.3 6.6% 8.5% 
ASIAN 3,050 234 13.0 0.4% 0.6% 
HISPANIC 35,468 2,097 16.9 5.2% 5.7% 
NATIVE AMERICAN 6,420 363 17.7 0.9% 1.0% 
OTHER RACE 9,874 662 14.9 1.4% 1.8% 
WHITE 583,013 30,320 19.2 85.4% 82.3% 
Source: Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Claims Data and Medicare Beneficiary Summary Files (MBSF) 
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BUPRENORPHINE 2,552 430 5.9 5.8% 8.3% 
ASIAN 
LOW DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 241 31 7.8 0.6% 0.6% 
HISPANIC 
LOW DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 2,439 286 8.5 5.6% 5.5% 
NATIVE AMERICAN 
LOW DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 402 56 7.2 0.9% 1.1% 
OTHER RACE 
LOW DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 804 85 9.5 1.8% 1.6% 
WHITE 
LOW DOSE 




BUPRENORPHINE 966 272 3.6 5.4% 10.3% 
ASIAN 
MEDIUM DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 31 11 2.8 0.2% 0.4% 
HISPANIC 
MEDIUM DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 1,233 157 7.9 6.9% 5.9% 
NATIVE AMERICAN 
MEDIUM DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 265 28 9.5 1.5% 1.1% 
OTHER RACE 
MEDIUM DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 409 46 8.9 2.3% 1.7% 
WHITE 
MEDIUM DOSE 









BUPRENORPHINE 1,865 92 20.3 0.4% 0.4% 
HISPANIC 
HIGH DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 26,815 1,220 22.0 5.1% 5.6% 
NATIVE AMERICAN 
HIGH DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 4,310 186 23.2 0.8% 0.9% 
OTHER RACE 
HIGH DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 6,702 298 22.5 1.3% 1.4% 
WHITE 
HIGH DOSE 
BUPRENORPHINE 454,077 18,146 25.0 86.1% 83.7% 
AFRICAN 
AMERICAN LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 7,890 1,203 6.6 8.9% 9.1% 
ASIAN LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 893 126 7.1 1.0% 1.0% 
HISPANIC LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 4,532 779 5.8 5.1% 5.9% 
NATIVE AMERICAN LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 1,376 163 8.4 1.5% 1.2% 
OTHER RACE LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 1,842 330 5.6 2.1% 2.5% 
WHITE LOW DOSE NALTREXONE 72,511 10,616 6.8 81.4% 80.3% 
AFRICAN 
AMERICAN HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 426 97 4.4 7.8% 9.7% 
ASIAN HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 20 6 3.3 0.4% 0.6% 
HISPANIC HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 449 74 6.1 8.3% 7.4% 
NATIVE AMERICAN HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 67 16 4.2 1.2% 1.6% 
OTHER RACE HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 117 25 4.7 2.2% 2.5% 
WHITE HIGH DOSE NALTREXONE 4,350 778 5.6 80.1% 78.1% 
Source: Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Claims Data and Medicare Beneficiary Summary Files (MBS
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Appendix Figure 3.1. Distribution of MAT Beneficiaries by Provider 
 
 
Source: Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Claims Data 
